Heidegger Reading Group

Final Post

2008-10-27T13:58:00.004-05:00

The posts on this blog document the 'minutes' of the Heidegger Reading Group, led by Kate Withy and Nate Zuckerman at the University of Chicago during the 2007-2008 academic year.

Anyone interested in discussing Heidegger further during the 2008-2009 year at the University of Chicago should check out the Contemporary European Philosophy Workshop.

Spring, Week 9 Meeting

2008-05-30T11:46:00.004-05:00

The Final Meeting

For our final meeting, the fates (aka the Social Science division) threw a party for us, with food and beer and a live band! So we: sat out on the grass, drank beer and ate burgers and brownies and chips. We talked about: how we felt reading §83 (the last section), Heidegger's philosophical reasons for ending with questions, the hermeneutic circle, how temporality is supposed to count as an explanation of dasein's being and being in general, whether §83 takes back the project or transitions to the next Division, the incompleteness of SZ, whether ontology requires an ontic basis, the motto 'ways, not works,' the so-called 'turn' in Heidegger's thinking (from dasein to being), whether Heidegger recants the project of SZ or builds on it in his later thinking, what it means for authentic cases of dasein to be prepared to take back resolutions, whether Heidegger must be authentic to write SZ, whether we must be authentic to read it, whether SZ is therapeutically designed to make us authentic, whether the text teaches us how to read it, Strauss, the Heidegger / Carnap affair, what it means to say that "the nothing nothings," the distinction between Heidegger's 'What is Metaphysics?' (1929), Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) and Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929), congratulations to Jim on his award!, congratulations to Nathana on her award!, what we were like in high school, the tendency to treat being as a cosmic entity distinct from dasein, the fact that being or intelligibility escapes, in part, our will and choice, our fundamental passivity with respect to being, uncanniness (Kate's dissertation), transcendental arguments (Nate's dissertation), the coming (oil) apocalypse, das Man in a post-apocalyptic society, what is das Man anyway?, whether das Man understands itself as without beginning or end, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, das Man's flight from death, why dasein tends to understand being as presence-at-hand, the band's lyrics (referring to illegal immigrants and terrorists having the blues), the significance and datability of world-time – appropriate and inappropriate times for activities, the difference between world-time and 'now-time' (or 'ordinary time'), Jim's dad, the extent to which authenticity involves a radical relationship to das Man, whether Plenty Coups was sufficiently dissatisfied, the relationship between authenticity and action, how to be environmentally authentic, the crisis in women's history described in a paper that floated by on the wind.

Thanks to everyone who did the reading, came to the meetings, asked tough philosophical questions and suggested interpretations of the text. We really enjoyed getting to know you and getting to know Heidegger better as a group, and are excited about the possibility of doing something similar next year. We all seemed to have learned a lot and gained a greater appreciation for Being and Time. Good luck finishing up the year and have a fun summer!

Spring, Week 7 Meeting -- Part I

2008-05-29T14:11:00.003-05:00

Where Are We?

We started out again by looking back over Being and Time as a whole, this time in order to situate Heidegger’s discussion of temporality within the context of his overarching philosophical project. We recalled that the goal of the book is to reawaken the question of the sense of being, and we pointed out that it’s debatable whether Heidegger’s ultimate intention is to answer that question or simply to explain how the question is intelligible and important to ask, whatever its answer turns out to be.

To achieve his goal, Heidegger first has to do fundamental ontology, and his discussion of temporality is the culmination of this intermittent step in the overarching argument. Fundamental ontology shows how any ontology (any understanding and meaningfulness of being) is possible at all, by explaining the origin of this possibility in terms of the being of dasein, the entity that understands being. It consists in an existential analytic of dasein, which is an interpretation of that entity’s being in terms of the articulated and unified ontological structure which makes it intelligible as the entity it is. This interpretation is phenomenological, which is to say it looks at our everyday, pre-thematic and pre-ontological understanding of being from a certain point of view, the view provided by the two ‘guiding clues’ or ‘formal indications’ Heidegger gives at the beginning of his treatise (in I.1): (1) the essence of dasein is its existence and (2) dasein’s being, which is always an issue for it, is in-each-case-mine [jemeinig]. These clues orient the phenomenological interpretation of being-in-the-world in terms of the ‘who’ of dasein, dasein’s world, and being-in (I.2-I.5), and Heidegger’s discussion of those structural moments bring dasein’s being into the fore-structure for the existential analytic’s phenomenological interpretation, as the structure of care (I.6). Heidegger finishes fleshing out the fore-structure by explaining how dasein is a whole and exists authentically in anticipatory resoluteness (II.1-II.3). This, however, is so far just the preparation for the interpretation, not the interpretation itself. Nate summed up this first part of Heidegger’s project by suggesting that the everyday understanding of being, the starting point for the existential analytic, already situates dasein’s being within the interpretation’s ‘fore-having,’ the formal indications provide the guiding point of view, or ‘fore-sight’ for the interpretation, and finally the care-structure—‘(who)-being-in-the-world’ construed as ‘ahead-of-itself–already-being-in (a world) as being-amidst (intraworldly entities)’—provides the articulated and unified structural phenomenon, or ‘fore-conception’ to be explained and grounded in the interpretation.

Fundamental ontology’s phenomenological interpretation culminates in the temporal interpretation of dasein’s being, which was our topic to read and discuss this week (II.3-II.4). Heidegger finishes preparing to reawaken the question of the sense of being by explaining how the care structure makes sense, in its articulation and its unity, in terms of time—not just any time, but what Heidegger calls ‘originary’ temporality. Heidegger’s discussion of temporality not only explains the structure of dasein’s being in terms of some peculiar temporal phenomenon, but also explains how our ordinary conception of time, as well as the time that structures our everyday existence in the world, arise as derivatives or modifications of this more primordial sense of temporality.

Finally, looking ahead, we saw that the temporal interpretation of dasein’s being would, in turn, somehow provide the basis for reawakening the question of the sense of being (II.5-(the unpublished) Division III), by explaining that upon which [das Woraufhin] dasein always projects and understands being (being, itself; being as such; being, in general).

Spring, Week 7 Meeting -- Part II

2008-05-29T14:10:00.001-05:00

Primordial Temporality

We began with a major interpretive question, which we raised but did not resolve: Is Heidegger simply setting us up to explain what being means to dasein, the sense of being as dasein understands it? or should we understand his goal to be setting us up to explain the sense of being, itself (as such, in general), independently of the terms in which dasein might happen to understand it? One way to ask this question is to ask whether the ‘setup’ provided by fundamental ontology—explaining how being is intelligible at all to dasein by interpreting dasein’s being in terms of time—ever gets ‘discharged’ so that we are simply left with being’s intelligibility simpliciter (dasein’s understanding of it notwithstanding).

We then wondered what kind of phenomenon primordial temporality is. Jim pointed out that there are two obvious ways to understand 'time': the linear temporal sequence measured by clocks (now-time, clock time, the ordinary conception of time), and time as it is experienced in the context of our daily activities (which Heidegger calls 'world-time'). Since Heidegger is going to derive both of these from primordial temporality, this latter must be something else entirely. We suggested that if primordial temporality is supposed to ground both the time of science (and present-at-hand entities) and the time of concern (and so ready-to-hand equipment), then it cannot be an experienced phenomenon but must be part of a structural explanation of how dasein as concernful being-in-the-world is possible. This makes it theoretically analogous to the structure of self-consciousness or the constitution of the soul or psyche, since these are not experienced as such but are rather what makes any experience possible at all. Since Heidegger has argued that, considered purely as a structure, anticipatory resoluteness (authenticity) is the condition of possibility of being-in-the-world, it follows that at this level of abstraction, anticipatory resoluteness is identical to primordial temporality. That is to say, both anticipatory resoluteness and originary temporality play the same role, as the condition of possibility of dasein. (This is, for example, why Heidegger can argue that primordial temporality is finite, by virtue of the fact that authenticity is also finite as being-towards-death.) Accordingly, we went on to explore primordial temporality by considering the structure of anticipatory resoluteness.

Spring, Week 7 Meeting -- Part III

2008-05-29T14:09:00.001-05:00

Anticipatory Resoluteness

To get clear on anticipatory resoluteness, we looked at its concrete manifestation in the example of Plenty Coups – particularly as contrasted to Sitting Bull. (We did, however, entertain the possibility that Plenty Coups does not strictly count as authentic, since he is a transitional figure who makes possible a fully authentic 'Crow poet'). We compared Plenty Coups's anticipation of death with Sitting Bull's inauthentic awaiting of an external, worldly event. We noticed that in his awaiting, Sitting Bull did not authentically retrieve or repeat the past of his tradition by appropriating a possibility from it that would be appropriate to new circumstances (as Plenty Coups did), but simply took over, and clung to, the Ghost Dance. (It was not clear, however, how this fits with Heidegger's characterisation of the inauthentic past as forgetting). Sitting Bull's awaiting was thus not passive in the ordinary sense, but involved a lot of activity. (Recall that when Heidegger introduced inauthenticity, he insisted that it is not inactive, but can go along precisely with busy-ness in the world of concern). This led us to wonder about the authentic way of making-present. Heidegger describes the authentic present in terms of both the Situation (which involves resolute taking action) and the Moment of Vision (in which nothing happens). We suggested that Plenty Coups's dream vision can be understood as a Moment of Vision, because it is much like the limit-experience of Angst, and involves the far-reaching sighting of possibilities (for Crow subjectivity) characteristic of resolute, anticipatory understanding.

Spring, Week 7 Meeting -- Part IV

2008-05-29T14:07:00.002-05:00

Temporality

We then turned to Heidegger's characterisation of temporality as the finite temporalising of the ecstases. Heidegger describes temporality by saying that the future makes present in the process of having been – or, more literally translated, temporality is the beening, presenting future (SZ 326). We noted that the future (Zu-kunft) is to be understood as 'coming-towards' (zu-kommen), and that it has a priority over the present and having been (the past). We can see this priority, for example, in the fact that for a stacker, the book shows up as something-to-be-put-away (present) on the basis of a self-understanding as a stacker (the future), rather than vice versa. Heidegger also says that having been is grounded in the future – and presumably he means that our past is what it is only on the basis of how we take it up in projecting ourselves into the future.

We then went on to consider the ecstatic character of temporality. "Ecstasis" comes from the Greek, and means 'standing-out.' So when Heidegger says that temporality is ecstatic, he means that it stands out – and it does so in three 'directions' or 'ecstases' (future, having been, present). Further, temporality is "the ekstatikon pure and simple" (SZ 329), where this means that there is nothing from which temporality stands out (a self-contained substance, say). Rather, temporality just is this movement of standing out. So too for Dasein – whose essence, recall, lies in existence (ex-sistere, to stand out).

Nate pointed out (anticipating our reading for the next meeting) that each ek-stasis has a horizon, and that looking at those horizons might give us some helpful clues for making sense of how temporality is ecstatic, what it means to be an ecstasis, and how this feature of the structure of originary temporality is supposed to be apt for interpreting dasein’s being. The horizon of the future ecstasis of time is something intelligible in terms of the ‘for-the-sake-of’ relation; dasein is futural insofar as it somehow ‘comes toward’ itself in existing for-the-sake-of-itself. The horizon of the past ecstasis of time is that in the face of which dasein has been thrown; dasein is ‘beening’ (or ‘having been’) insofar as it finds itself thrown into its existence and world and finds this mattering to it, for instance through moods. The horizon of the present ecstasis of time, Heidegger says, is something intelligible in terms of the ‘in-order-to’ relation; dasein presents (or ‘makes present’) insofar as intraworldly entities show up to it intelligibly, which is to say, insofar as it deals with (or comports understandingly toward) the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand in existing. From this we concluded that the structure of these temporal ecstases will make more sense if we can figure out what sorts of things can count as (a) that for the sake of which dasein exists, (b) that in the face of which dasein finds itself thrown and (c) that which can show up to dasein as fitting into a series of in-order-to relations constitutive of dasein’s concern.

Spring, Week 5 Meeting -- Part I

2008-05-05T11:54:00.006-05:00

Introduction, Orientation

At this meeting, we were very lucky to have Professor Jonathan Lear visit as our guest speaker. (You can find out more about his work here). Prof. Lear's most recent book, Radical Hope, uses the historical example of the Crow chief, Plenty Coups, to explore the collapse of a way of life and the question of how to live with this possibility. We can read this text as an attempt to come to terms with what Heidegger means by authentic being-towards-death. Kate suggested that we can map the three chapters of Radical Hope on to the first three chapters of Division II of Being and Time in the following way (click on the table to see it full-size):

Spring, Week 5 Meeting -- Part II

2008-05-05T11:51:00.003-05:00

Jonathan Lear on Radical Hope and Being and Time

Prof. Lear began by talking about the personal and philosophical genesis of Radical Hope. With respect to Being and Time, the concern is about the lack of clarity regarding its ethical dimension: if authenticity is an ontological or existential phenomenon rather than an ethical one, how does it show up in a life? Is it consistent with being a bad person? To really understand authenticity, we need to consider Heidegger's ontology through a concrete case. Radical Hope is an attempt to do this.

Such an approach can reveal various things about what it is to understand being that are not obvious in the abstract register in which BT is written. Jonathan outlined two of these. First, in considering the breaking down of an understanding of being, we must distinguish between the demands of theoretical reason and those of practical reason. We might think that since the Crow can still remember their old ways of life, these therefore remain intelligible. So where is the breakdown? This question reveals that while the concepts in question may remain theoretically intelligible, they are not thereby practically intelligible (as items of practical reason). The breakdown takes place in our self-understanding – it is a breakdown in my ability to make sense of myself and others in terms of these concepts. This is a breakdown in my ability to move from a theoretical understanding of the past to a practical understanding of how I am to go on in the present and the future.

Second, we need to distinguish between the psychological phenomenon and the ontological phenomenon of breakdown. It is a mistake to think that the breakdown of intelligibility at issue is a psychological state that I manifest. Jonathan clarified this mistake by outlining three senses of intelligibility and its breakdown, using the example of marriage:

1. It no longer makes sense that I am (or was) married to this person. This is an issue about my relationship to another person, and it is a psychological phenomenon.

2. The idea of marriage no longer makes sense to me. This is a problem in my relationship to a concept, and is also a psychological phenomenon.

3. The intelligibility of the concept of marriage breaks down. This does not happen to me, but to the concept or way of life itself. The concept – rather than my relationship to it – breaks down. This is an ontological phenomenon, and there are many different ways of relating to it psychologically. (Jonathan gave the example of a future kalipolis, in which the Guardians abolish all intimacy and sexual reproduction. In this situation, I might be able to remember the concept of marriage, but I can no longer take this theoretical understanding and intelligibly render myself as married.)

This third case is not a psychological phenomenon, and it does not involve a breakdown in a theoretical understanding. Rather, a way of living with this concept breaks down. The suggestion is that this is what the Crow had to endure. This shows us something about what an understanding being is – namely, that it is crucial to an understanding of being that we are able to live (with) it. Accordingly, Jonathan suggested that we take the kind of breakdown in an understanding of being that Prof. Haugeland focuses on (a theoretical breakdown, exemplified by crises in the sciences) as a special case rather than as the paradigm.

Spring, Week 5 Meeting -- Part III

2008-05-05T11:48:00.003-05:00

Discussion

Jim asked: how can we judge that Plenty Coups was right and Sitting Bull was wrong? That is, how can we tell the difference between courageously redefining one's culture and betraying it? Jonathan acknowledged that this is a contested issue. But what is clear is that Sitting Bull's response does not count as courageous: doing nothing else but dance the Ghost Dance for several months in order to wipe out the white settlers. This is instead wishful optimism. But it does not follow that fighting to the death is necessarily a worse or less courageous decision than Plenty Coups'.

One philosophical question in this is: if the virtues are character formations that involve relating to possibilities, then can there be a virtuous response to a breakdown in the very field of possibilities? Is virtue possible at all in this situation? If so, then it is likely that this virtue will be courage. Courage is a way of living well with the riskiness of human life, and so a good candidate for virtuously facing up to a risk to a way of life. However, courage is traditionally associated with battle and manliness, so it needs to be thinned out. Aristotle supplies us with the framework for a thinned-out concept of courage, and Plenty Coups (via his dream) supplies us with an account of the psychological transformation required to thin out a traditional conception of courage and so meet a crisis virtuously.

Nathana asked how successful we can consider Plenty Coups to have been in securing the Crow's future, given that he considered his reservation life to be one in which nothing happened. Surely he was not the Crow poet opening up a new future for the Crow? Jonathan agreed: Plenty Coups is successful as a transitional figure (like Moses) in that he made it possible for the Crow to go on without despair until poets could arise to reinvent Crow culture and traditions.

Part of what is involved in this is a firm commitment to a transcendent goodness in the world. This commitment is what allows a people to endure transition, and it is one reason that the Crow might have decided not to go down fighting. Such a belief in transcendent goodness may be religious ('God made the world good'), but it need not be. We could also hold to a secular transcendence: we are finite, and to embrace this involves accepting that our best understanding of the good is also finite – that goodness outstrips us. (This vocabulary brings us quite close to what Heidegger means by authentic being-towards-death.) A commitment to our finitude and a transcendent goodness is manifest in the ability to endure transitional periods.

In response to a question from Josh, Jonathan pointed out that it is easy to overlook what is going on in this transitional period. From a certain perspective, it may seem that what happened to the Crow is just the stuff of history. We might think that understandings of being don't really break down, but they do change in response to challenges and so manifest various continuities and discontinuities. The Crow, then, have a past, present and a future (albeit a rather dramatic one). If this is right, there is no philosophy to be done here, only anthropology. But this picture overlooks what is important about the transitional period. In those 60-75 years, there was some important sense in which no one could say what they were doing. There was no answer to what it is to be a chief, or even to be a Crow. After this period (as we are seeing now), creative activities within Crow life begin to supply answers to these questions. Things happened during the transitional period that allowed for this creative reinvention, and the philosophical question is: how are we to understand these transitional happenings ontologically? What kind of happenings are they? This philosophical-ontological issue is very easy to overlook.

Finally, Aaron and Jim asked questions about how we can identify those aspects of a way of life or understanding of being the breakdown of which counts as death or the collapse of a way of life. Are there not cases in which something becomes impossible that nonetheless do not count as such a breakdown? Jonathan pointed out that it is not sufficient to just say that the difference here is the psychological one of how much you guide life by a particular possibility or understanding. Although it is difficult to judge some cases, we can reliably identify clear cases of discontinuity (death) and continuity (non-death). The important thing is to avoid the temptation to overlook the discontinuity in a way of life – to overlook its breakdown – and to consider it just as the passage of a culture through history.

Spring, Week 5 Meeting -- Part IV

2008-05-05T11:47:00.002-05:00

Heidegger

Although we didn't explicitly discuss the theoretical framework of Heidegger's anticipatory resoluteness (II.III), we did get clearer on what the commitment and flexibility of authenticity looks like in a human life. We also continued our exploration of what death, the breakdown of an understanding of being, amounts to. Notice that in talking about authenticity, we have employed the vocabulary of temporality: authenticity is a matter of being able to stand firmly in the present and go on into the future on the basis of (or despite) a radical break in one's past. At our next meeting, we will consider in more detail the temporality of dasein and authenticity.

Spring, Week 4 Meeting

2008-04-28T14:42:00.001-05:00

Our fourth-week meeting picked up from our first-week discussion of dasein and death. We had a looser discussion ranging over several tough questions. Here is a quick description of most of those questions:

(1) We discussed whether there can be dasein without human beings, if, as John Haugeland argues, dasein is a way of life that embodies an understanding of being. We also wondered whether there can be persons without dasein. We did not, however, come to a consensus on the answers to these questions, but instead took up another question: (2) Supposing that some person ‘survives’ the death of her way of life and comes to adopt some other way of life (we might say, ‘comes to be born into’ some other dasein), how should we conceive of what, or who, persisted ‘in between’ the death of the one and the incipient existence of the other? What makes it intuitive to ask this question is the thought that someone whose way of life is dead may nevertheless ‘subsist’—move from place to place, cook and eat, have a partner and a children (would this count as a ‘family’?), etc. If, ‘in between’ the one dasein and the other, there is no overarching context in which to make sense of the person’s activity, how are we to understand what the person is doing? Do we have to make recourse to merely physical, biological, neurological explanations? Is there a minimal, ‘dasein-like’ intelligibility to the person’s activity, even in the absence of a robust milieu in which to make sense of her? (3) We also puzzled over the appropriate ‘scope’ or level of generality for locating the phenomenon of dasein. Can something as specific as ‘fourth-year Heidegger reading group participants at the University of Chicago in 2007-2008’ count as dasein? Does something as general as ‘the Western European way of life’ have enough of a particular sense to bring anything dasein-like into view? Finally, we discussed various things that seem to count as misunderstanding being. One might, more ‘locally,’ understand the being of spatial (extended) entities in terms of location at a discrete, determine position in absolute space, rather than in terms of whatever quantum probability function (or whatever) constitutes the contemporary, accepted conception of the spatial. A different example would be understanding one’s own being in terms of the ‘anyone’ self [das Man] and one’s factical, worldly concerns, rather than in terms of one’s ownmost ability-to-be. A more egregious form of misunderstanding seems to be ‘crossing levels’ or regions of being, for example, by understanding mental phenomenon in terms appropriate to physical or neurochemical phenomenon (assuming this counts as a mistake!), or, to give a clearer example, understanding something ready-to-hand as merely present-at-hand. We did not elaborate on this question, but it was raised in connection with the description of dasein as an entity that essentially understands being—if dasein dies, is that because it embodied a fatal misunderstanding of being?

Next week we will meet with Jonathan Lear and discuss his book Radical Hope, in which he describes something very much like Heidegger’s notion of authentic existence. We hope this will give occasion to reflect on and further discuss our questions from this meeting.

Social Thought Colloquium: Richard Polt

2008-04-28T13:33:00.004-05:00

The Committee On Social Thought invites you to a Colloquium:

Speaker: Richard Polt

Title: "When Time Comes to Be: Heideggerian and Arendtian Inceptions"

Date: Monday, May 5th
Time: 4:30 p.m.
Room: Social Sciences 302 (Shils Room)

Richard Polt is Professor of Philosophy at Xavier University, Cincinatti. He is the author of Heidegger: An Introduction - which Charles Guignon described as "the best general introduction to Heidegger ever written" - as well as The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger's 'Contributions to Philosophy'; he has edited collections of essays on Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics; and he has co-translated the latter work. He is also an alumnus of the Committee On Social Thought, where he received his Ph.D. in 1991 under the supervision of Leszek Kolakowski.

Heidegger terminology on Wikipedia

2008-04-10T11:03:00.002-05:00

Just for kicks, I added a link in the "Heidegger on the Web" section to Wikipedia's entry on Heideggerian terminology. Given our nitpickiness in the group so far about the meaning and translation of his terms, I think you are each equipped to go into the guts of that page and start some editing wars over their proper explication. Already, for instance, I see 'present-at-hand' and 'ready-to-hand' described as "attitudes toward to things in the world [sic]." Sic indeed ...

Dreyfus on White on Heidegger on Death

2008-04-10T10:52:00.003-05:00

Browsing around the web, I found an online pdf of the Forward that Prof. Dreyfus wrote for a new book on Heidegger, Carol J. White's Time and Death: Heidegger's Analysis of Finitude. I'm linking to it because Prof. Dreyfus makes (especially in section IV of the paper) an interesting and relevant attempt to map out different possible interpretations of Heidegger's notion of death (Prof. Haugeland's included). It's worth looking at in light of our most recent meeting. You can read it here.

Post any reactions in the comments!

Spring, Week 1 Meeting -- Part I

2008-04-07T15:20:00.002-05:00

Background

We were very lucky to have Professor John Haugeland as our guest speaker at this meeting. Prof. Haugeland contributed to the renewed interest in Heidegger’s philosophy amongst English-speaking philosophers in the late 20^th century by arguing that Division II of Being and Time – with its discussion of death, conscience and guilt – is not peripheral (as many readers initially thought) but is instead central for understanding Heidegger’s claims about dasein, being and time. You can find links to some of Prof. Haugeland’s articles on Heidegger here.

We began by situating ourselves in the text: we have seen, in Division I, that dasein's being is to be grasped in its unity as care. But before we begin to draw conclusions about being from this, we need to be sure that we have all of dasein in view. Heidegger begins Division II by pointing out that we haven't considered either dasein's authenticity or its totality. II.1 analyses death, which is dasein's ‘end,’ so as to determine how dasein can be a whole.

Why analyse death? We know that death is a significant feature of human life, but we also know that the existential analytic is preparatory for working out how being can be intelligible. This means that only those phenomena that shed light on what it takes for Dasein to understand being are included in the existential analytic. So death must be connected to the understanding of being – but how?

Prof. Haugeland answers this question by interpreting death as the breakdown of an understanding of being. He holds that if Being and Time is a book about how being makes sense, then it must consider how being can fail to make sense or be misunderstood. Death is this failure. This reading is in contrast to the usual "existentialist" interpretation of II.1, which takes death as the mortality of human beings. Prof. Haugeland's interpretation requires a novel reading of several of the key concepts explored in Division I, including 'dasein' itself. (Note that in summarising the discussion, we have retained much of Prof. Haugeland's evocative and idiosyncratic language).

Spring, Week 1 Meeting -- Part II

2008-04-07T15:19:00.001-05:00

Others and Dasein

We first recalled the analysis of 'others' in I.4. The idea was to prepare to understand what it would be for dasein to die by contrasting this with something more familiar, but distinct: what it is for others to die. Others, Prof. Haugeland argued, are intraworldly entities, just like equipment – and indeed, the discussion of others in I.4 can be seen to have a structure that is neatly parallel to the discussion of the ready-to-hand in I.3. Since others, like equipment, are entities that show up within the world 'cleared' or 'opened' by dasein's disclosedness, others are not dasein. Furthermore, Prof. Haugeland argued, we should not read ‘others’ [die Anderen] as ‘every other person but me,’ since the role of ‘another’ is one that, in each case, I myself can play (particularly when my existence is public). When I call someone on the telephone, for example, my use of the phone and my ways of greeting and conversing are for the most part the same as others’ – I dial the string of numbers, I begin with “Hello,” etc. ‘Others,’ then, are people (myself included). If others are people and others are not dasein, then dasein is neither identical to, nor coextensive with, people. Thus, the death of others – the death of people – is not the death of dasein. To understand what it is for dasein to die, we need to look at phenomena different than those associated with the demise of persons (more about ‘demise’ in the next section). And this makes sense, given what we know so far of Prof. Haugeland’s understanding of ‘dasein’ – if dasein is a way of life that embodies or incorporates an understanding of being, then the death of a way of life or an understanding of being tout court would seem to be something different than the demise of some one case of dasein who understands being.

Spring, Week 1 Meeting -- Part III

2008-04-07T15:18:00.001-05:00

Death

With these distinctions in mind, we can better understand Heidegger's distinctions between perishing, demise and death. These three ‘death-like’ phenomena are distinct because they are exhibited in distinct kinds of entities. Perishing is what happens to living things; it is their ceasing to be alive. It has nothing to do with Dasein or being-towards-death. Demise applies to people, and it is a social event – the event at which your possessions pass to your heirs, at which your spouse becomes a widow/er, and so on. We can think of demise as a ‘legal death,’ as ceasing to be a person in society. Typically, such demise is concurrent with perishing. This is because it just so happens that for every person (who can demise) there is a "biological specimen" (a homo sapiens) which can perish. Nonetheless, people and homo sapiens are distinct kinds of entities, so perishing and demise are distinct ways of ending.

'Death' is the term reserved for the ending of dasein. What would it be for a way of life to end? We considered the example of the ending of the way of life of the Jewish community in pre-war Western Europe. In some sense, this becomes a "dead" way of life, where this means that Jewish weddings, brisses, celebrating Passover, and so on, end – not because someone is literally, physically preventing these events from happening, but because they no longer make sense as a way of life. Death, then, is the coming-undone or failing of a whole rich fabric of mutual intelligibility.

To make this more precise, we contrasted the examples of the coal man on a coal-powered train and the superfluous elevator operator who can no longer pursue their professions. Although there are difficulties in spelling out exactly why these don't count as the death of dasein, we can see that the elevator man experiences a breakdown in his situation with respect to entities, given his understanding of being, rather than a breakdown in his understanding of being per se. This suggests that being an elevator man doesn't quite count as a way of life (as dasein), because it is in some way insufficiently rich, complex and internally integrated.

Nikhil suggested that even when the Jewish way of life died, those who used to live it might have still found themselves (in Heidegger’s technical sense of Befindlichkeit) as Jews, might have still felt compelled to make sense of their lives in those terms. This brings out what, on the existential level, is so traumatic about the death of a way of life, where one cannot – yet cannot help but – make sense of oneself in terms of the way of life that has died.

We also considered the situation of classical physics at the beginning of the 20^th Century. In this case, the whole intelligibility of physical things came unglued – as it did with the Copernican revolution (where, as Prof. Haugeland put it, “the world got literally turned upside down”). Unlike the elevator man or the coal man, this is not a breakdown in relating to entities, but a breakdown in how the world itself works or makes sense, and how we understand our place in that world. In this breakdown, everything comes apart and we don't know how to project entities at all.

Spring, Week 1 Meeting -- Part IV

2008-04-07T15:15:00.003-05:00

Being-towards-Death

These examples of the death of dasein should make it clear that death is not an event. As Heidegger says, death is only in being-towards-death. Death, as the breakdown of a way of life, consists in realising that you can't go on living that way of life, that you can no longer project entities onto those possibilities that constitute your understanding of being. This can be contrasted to the biological event of perishing, in which there can be no such realisation of an inability to go on (or for which such realisation is irrelevant). The death of dasein happens only when the breakdown of the understanding of being is confronted – when you confront the fact that your understanding of being might be a misunderstanding.

Accordingly, being-towards-death is a matter of existing in the face of the possibility that one might have misunderstood being all along. To put it another way, it is understanding that one’s understanding of being is finite, and living one’s life in light of this understanding. One form this way of living can take is taking responsibility for the viability of one’s way of life. This does not mean that you take it as your job to ensure that the way of life continues to be viable no matter what, but rather that you take it as up to you to tell whether or not it remains viable (i.e. whether or not you can keep living it).

This is (at least a hint at) 'authentic' being-towards-death. Prof. Haugeland – and Kate and Nate – think that since the term 'authentic' usually means 'real' or 'genuine,’ this word can give the wrong impression about what Heidegger means by ‘eigentlich.’ (Not only do 'real' and 'genuine' belong to the vocabulary of the present-at-hand, but they also imply that 'inauthentic' cases of dasein are somehow fake or counterfeit.) We prefer to translate 'eigentlich' as 'owned' (picking up on its root ‘eigen,’ 'own'). (Thus uneigentlich dasein is unowned or disowned.) The vocabulary of 'ownedness' connects to the in-each-case-mineness of dasein, since it implies that someone has taken over dasein as his or her own, as ‘mine.’ This 'taking over' ("on purpose mineness") is a modification of 'in-each-case-mineness' (which applies to both owned and unowned dasein). It consists in making dasein, my way of life, my own in the sense that I take responsibility for it and won't put up with things not making sense in it, with incompatibilities or “contraries” in my understanding of being. So for dasein to be one's own 'on purpose' is for one to commit to both trying to keep one's way of life (and the understanding of being it embodies) still viable when things go awry, and recognising when things are going awry because that way of life is no longer viable.

Spring, Week 1 Meeting -- Part V

2008-04-07T15:11:00.004-05:00

The Features of Death

We ended the discussion by briefly covering some of the features of death that Heidegger discusses, with particular emphasis on how the seemingly 'personal' character of these features fits with Prof. Haugeland's interpretation of death. We saw that (being-towards-)death is 'non-relational' in the sense that each person who confronts the death of dasein, the breakdown of his or her way of life, confronts it as a breakdown for him or her, and so takes the responsibility for that upon him- or herself. This also shows how (being-towards-)death can be individualising: an individual case of dasein has to take responsibility for his or her way of life. If dasein is a way of life, then it is not the kind of thing that can take responsibility. But the people who lead that way of life can take responsibility for it, and when they do so, they are individualised as people who lead that way of life.

We did not discuss all of the features of death in detail, although we did touch on most of them. Here is the chart we had on the board summarising these (click on the chart to see it full-size):

Being-In Discussion

2008-04-07T13:55:00.009-05:00

As requested, here is Kate and Nate's discussion about being-in and the care chart.

The issue is how to construe being-in on the chart; initially, Kate and Nate differed on this. Here are the two options, with the relevant differences marked in bold in the asterisked row (click on the charts to see them full-size):

What's at stake in this?

The different ways of describing the chart's columns raise the question of how we are to understand being-in as such – that is, disclosedness itself. Option (i) is motivated by the thought that being-in as such is supposed to explain how dasein comports towards entities (in their being). Option (ii) is motivated by the thought that being-in as such addresses how dasein understands (the) being (of entities). Thus the issue is about whether we take what is important about dasein to be the fact that it relates to entities (in their being) or the fact that it relates to being (as the being of entities). Clearly, this is a question of emphasis. Although there may be philosophical consequences of reading SZ in one way rather than the other, our suspicion is that the stakes are primarily pedagogical.

Discussion

On option (i), all of the columns together show dasein as ontico-ontological. The first two show the ontological and third shows the ontic dimension of dasein. On option (ii), the third column names fallen dasein as ontico-ontological, and the first two columns show dasein as ontological. There are two related issues here: first, whether the third (right hand) column should be characterised as (i) ontic or (ii) ontico-ontological; and second, whether the third column should be characterised in terms of (i) comportment towards entities or (ii) comportment towards entities as entities. This latter also affects how we fill out the left hand columns.

Our first concern was that describing the third (right hand) column as (i) ontic / comportment towards entities might be misleading in two ways. First, it may imply that there is a 'comportment towards entities' (ontic) that can be distinguished from 'comportment towards entities as entities' (ontological). But dasein's comportment towards entities just is comportment towards entities as entities (= comporting towards entities in their being). Putting these in separate columns may thus invite the following misunderstanding: dasein has an access to entities that is distinct from its comporting towards entities in their being; its understanding of being is mysteriously tacked on to an independent (perceptual, physical) access to entities, as a soul is tacked on to an animal body.

The second way in which option (i) might be misleading lies in the way that the left hand columns are described. On option (i), being-in as such is glossed as comporting towards entities as entities. But this obscures the fact that we only get entities in the picture when being-in is fallen (the third column). Being-in as such (the first two columns) is Dasein's disclosedness (projecting possibilities, finding thrownness, articulating intelligibility), which is its openness to being.

Option (ii) attempts to avoid both of these problems, but runs into equally serious problems of its own. First, it addresses the second problem by describing being-in as openness to being rather than comportment towards entities as entities (i.e. in their being). But this risks severing dasein's openness to being from its comportment towards entities, and so implying that dasein's disclosure of being is some kind of mystical communion distinct from its everyday dealings with entities. Being is always the being of entities, so an openness to being is always an openness to entities in their being.

Option (ii) addresses the first problem by describing fallen dasein not as ontic, but as ontico-ontological. Dasein never simply relates to entities apart from its comportment towards them as entities (i.e. in their being), so is never merely ontic. Identifying the right hand column as ontico-ontological makes clear that it is a modification (via falling) of the left hand columns, rather than an addition to or substratum for them. It emphasises that the columns cannot be understood separately. The problem with this is that it might not be clear what the 'ontological' columns add to the picture, if the right hand column is in itself (ontico-)ontological.

So the problem is basically this: given that the chart is supposed to show dasein as ontico-ontological, and given that it is through falling (the right hand column) that dasein's understanding of being connects up with the ontic, do we characterise this right hand column in terms of the "whole" that is realised in it (ontico-ontological) or the "part" that is contributed by it (ontic)? Similarly for the left hand columns. In other words: given that in making a chart we have to draw lines through the insoluble unity of dasein's being, where do we put the lines? Do we take Dasein as the (ontic) entity that understands the being of entities (ontological), or as the understander of being (ontological) that grasps being through entities (ontico-ontological)?

Winter, Week 10 Meeting (Part I)

2008-03-31T15:28:00.001-05:00

I.6 : Reality (§43) and Truth (§44)

Last time we saw that dasein's being can be grasped in its unity as care: being-ahead-of-itself-already-in-(a world) as being-amidst (intraworldly-entities). Recall that the goal of BT is to raise the question of what it means to be, and that the analysis of dasein's being is designed to help us do this. We noted that BT’s initial question ‘what does it mean to be?’ gets pursued through the investigation of dasein, the entity that understands being, and therefore gets transformed into the question ‘what does it mean to be dasein?’ – or, put another way, ‘what is it to be able to understand being (at all, in general)?’. So, having established that dasein's being is care, it seems we should now be in a position to say something about being itself.

However, we noted that Heidegger concludes these sections (as he often does) with a question: have we really grasped all of dasein? The answer is no, and this shows that dasein's existence needs to be interpreted further before we can say anything more about the meaning of being.

But we are already in a position to re-think two phenomena that have traditionally been closely associated with being: reality and truth. We discussed some of Heidegger’s claims to the effect that the existential understanding of truth and reality is different from – and in fact grounds – the ways truth and reality have traditionally been understood in their connection with the phenomenon of being.

Winter, Week 10 Meeting (Part II)

2008-03-31T15:26:00.003-05:00

Reality (§43)

We discussed four questions (or “problems”) Heidegger finds associated with the traditional conception of being and reality: (1) whether entities independent of (“external to”) dasein are at all, (2) whether it’s possible to prove the (“external”) world is real, (3) whether entities and the world independent of dasein can be known as they are “in themselves,” and (4) what it truly means to be real, in the first place.

We explained the sense in which reality, according to Heidegger, has been traditionally construed in terms of the presence to the mind of a substance possessing essential and accidental properties. We pointed out the counterintuitive consequences of construing the real as essentially ‘subjective’ or mind-dependent, on the one hand (since we think that reality is distinct from and independent of our own mental representations of it), or as simply ‘objective’ in the sense of material and non-mental, on the other hand (since we are inclined to believe there are mental phenomena distinct from material phenomena). Heidegger inveighs against the traditional concept of reality because it makes it seem like the four problems above are genuine problems. The strict, ontological division of 'subjective' and 'objective', 'internal' and 'external' implies that there is a general philosophical problem of how to bridge the ontological (and epistemological) 'gap' between these, a problem whose solution constrains what we can coherently say about the meaning of being. Heidegger, in contrast, wants to reject these problems as philosophically illegitimate, and this, we concluded, is something that motivates his contrasting view of dasein as being-in-the-world. Heidegger argues that neither dasein nor ready-to-hand, intraworldly entities (nor, for that matter, present-at-hand entities) can be made intelligible on its own, independently of the intelligibility of the other, so there is no such ‘gap’ between them to be bridged. We briefly discussed two places Heidegger makes (something like) this argument: (1) in his claim that human life (existence, projection onto abilities-to-be-dasein) is intelligible if and only if the equipment with which (and the others with whom) human life is lived are also intelligible, and (2) his claim that when dasein’s possibilities cease to be intelligible in the face of Angst, the entities in one’s world also cease to be intelligible as the entities they are.

Winter, Week 10 Meeting (Part III)

2008-03-31T15:24:00.002-05:00

What depends on Dasein?

We began the second hour of our meeting by juxtaposing passages from §43 and §44 to show that there is a structural similarity between the way that reality does and does not depend on Dasein and the way that truth does and does not depend on Dasein. We read passages from SZ 212 and SZ 226.

To get clear (or perhaps less clear) on this, we discussed the popular philosophical problem of whether a tree makes a sound if it falls in the woods and there is no one there to hear it. We agreed that there is some brute event taking place, and that in order to make sense of this as a noise consisting of sound waves (as physicists might) or as a meaningful sound (as hikers might), we have to have dasein (as the entity that makes sense of things) in the picture. This does not mean that there must be someone with appropriate organs around to hear the noise in order for it to happen, but rather that there must be cases of dasein (with an understanding of being) around in order for the event to be intelligible as any kind of event. This applies retrospectively: we can make sense of a tree falling in the Jurassic period as making a noise in the sense (at least) of emitting sound waves, because we do so from our perspective, as currently existing cases of dasein, and because we have at our disposal a way of making sense of things (namely, physical science) that makes human-independent occurrences intelligible for us.

Heidegger's point is that what's going on with entities doesn't depend on dasein, but that any kind of making sense of this – including making sense of an occurrence as dasein-independent – does depend on dasein.

Winter, Week 10 Meeting (Part IV)

2008-03-31T15:22:00.003-05:00

Truth (§44)

We didn't have time to discuss Heidegger's account of truth in detail. We did note that, according to Heidegger, truth is traditionally construed as a correspondence or agreement between assertions and entities (or ‘the world,’ or ‘reality’). By contrast, and for similar reasons as were involved in his repudiation of the traditional conception of reality, Heidegger argues that the traditional concept of truth as correspondence or agreement depends on the ability of dasein to discover entities and disclose being. Thus, he calls dasein's discovery of entities 'truth,' on account of the entities’ being ‘set free’ or ‘uncovered’ by dasein so that they can show up to it (rather than remaining covered up, in obscurity). Truth, for Heidegger, is a way of being: being-true, being-uncovering. But this is only part of Heidegger's account of truth, and it leaves out his argument. For further discussion of this section and the reality section, you should look at Richard Polt's Heidegger: an Introduction (pp. 80-84).

Next Quarter: Invited Speakers

2008-03-20T10:42:00.002-05:00

Next quarter we will have two guest speakers from the University of Chicago. John Haugeland will visit us first, to discuss death and dasein. Then Jonathan Lear will visit a bit later, to discuss authenticity. Prof. Lear's discussion will spring from one of his most recent books, Radical Hope, which you could read over break (it's short and compelling) if you want some background for his talk.

As of the end of winter quarter, we plan to meet again on Thursday, April 3, from 5:00-7:00 p.m. We'll try to find a room in Cobb, as usual. This will likely be our meeting with Prof. Haugeland, so prepare your thoughts about what it is to be towards death and what in the hell 'dasein' means!

Have a good break,
Kate and nate

Winter, Week 8 Meeting - Part I

2008-03-03T15:37:00.005-06:00

Care (§39, §41, §42)

In the first hour of the meeting, we put together all of the concepts that Heidegger has used to illuminate dasein’s being throughout Division I of BT. We began with an overview of Division I thus far: Heidegger aims to reawaken the question of the meaning of being (Introduction), and proceeds through an analysis of dasein’s being (the existential analytic) because dasein is the entity that understands being (I.1). Since dasein’s basic constitution of being is being-in-the-world (I.2), Heidegger analyses world (I.3), the ‘who’ (I.4) and being-in as such (I.5). Now, in I.6, the task is grasp the unity of dasein’s being, which Heidegger calls ‘care.’

To demonstrate and understand this unity, we produced the following chart, which collects most of the major concepts that Heidegger has introduced (click the chart to see it full-size):

We noted the following thing about Heidegger’s (ridiculously) hyphenated version of ‘care’ (“ahead-of-itself-being-already-in(-the-world) as being-amidst (encountering, intraworldly entities))”: The ‘as’ in that formulation signifies that dasein’s being—its disclosedness, its being the ‘there,’ its understanding of being, its existence, its being-in-the-world—must happen through its dealings with particular entities, that is, through its everyday, fallen being-in (in the same way that a basketball game must happen through particular plays, players and equipment). This parallels something we noted in describing the structure of dasein’s disclosedness, following Haugeland, as a coin, with ‘being-in’ being the metal of which ‘the who’ and ‘the world’ are sides: To be dasein is to be-in, to be-amidst, to be-with, to relate to entities; and being a self and having a world are not separate entities or events from this being-in, they are rather two aspects of it, two ways of bringing it into view. We also recalled that dasein’s comportment toward entities as entities involves both (1) comporting toward (or discovering) entities as entities, having entities encounter it or show up to it in their being, which is ontic-ontological, and (2) disclosing being, which happens on the ontological level. Accordingly, the second and third columns of the chart reflect the ontological level of dasein’s disclosedness and of care, while the right-most column reflects the ontic-ontological level, and being-in-the-world as a whole happens through these two basic structural aspects together.

We also noticed that it is relatively easy to see how these three dimensions will map onto time, although Heidegger will be appealing to a conception of time radically unlike our ordinary one.

We wondered why Heidegger calls this structure ‘care’ – particularly given that he rejects many of the ordinary connotations of ‘care’ as inappropriate. We suggested that ‘care’ refers to something like ‘taking life seriously.’ Even if a case of dasein leads an ironic life or is a carefree slacker, they still take their ironic or slacker lifestyle seriously. The slacker is invested in being a slacker, and guides his life in terms of slacker-values. So ‘care’ is supposed to capture the fact that human life always occurs as immersed and invested, and is never first of all a matter of a neutral subject confronting an objective world.

Winter, Week 8 Meeting - Part II

2008-03-03T15:29:00.003-06:00

Angst (§40)

The limit-experience of Angst is supposed to reveal the unity of dasein’s being in care. Recall that to identify the being of an entity, we need to look at dasein’s disclosure of its being, since dasein is the entity that understands being. So to get at the being of dasein, we need to consider dasein’s self-disclosure. However, because it is falling, dasein has a tendency to misunderstand its own being. We need an experience in which dasein discloses itself in a way that does not involve misunderstanding, and so an experience which disrupts its falling. Angst is such an experience because it involves a breakdown in the everyday, public world into which dasein falls.

Angst is a mood or mode of findingness, and so involves the same three structural moments as fear (§30). But unlike fear, the in-the-face-of-which that threatens in Angst is not an innerworldly entity approaching from a definite region. It is completely indefinite and poses an indefinite threat. (Compare the anxious portions of horror movies before the bad guy is revealed, in contrast to the fearful scenes following this revelation). Since it is no thing, what threatens is nothing. And since it does not approach from anywhere specific in the world, it is nowhere. There is nothing in particular that we are anxious about; rather, we are anxious in the face of everything and nothing. In colloquial language, we might say that we are anxious in the face of the fact that there are meaningful things and that we have to deal with them. This is to say that the in-the-face-of-which of Angst is the (everyday, fallen) world. Thus Angst discloses the ‘amidst-innerworldly-entities,’ or falling, dimension of care.

The about-which of Angst is dasein’s authentic ability-to-be-in-the-world. Consider fear again: that about which one fears is oneself – one is afraid for one’s specific lifestyle, bodily integrity, or property. But in Angst, that which threatens is indefinite, so that to which it poses a threat is also indefinite. One is not anxious about any of the particulars of one’s fallen, worldly life, but about the fact that one has such a life at all. This reveals that cases of dasein are in the business having lives – that is, of projecting themselves onto possibilities. (We suggested that one might have such an anxious realisation after graduating, or at any point at which one must make ‘life choices’). This is the revelation of dasein’s authentic self, and so of the projective or ‘ahead-of-itself’ moment of care.

The final moment in the structure of moods is the mood as such – fearing itself, or Angst itself, as disclosive. Although Heidegger barely mentions it, since Angst is a mood it involves the disclosure of moodedness itself, and so the ‘already-in-a-world’ or finding aspect of care.

There was some discussion in the meeting about whether to map this last moment of Angst onto ‘amidst-innerworldly-entities’ / falling (on the grounds that the mood of Angst is an experience within a life that disrupts falling). If we did this, the in-the-face-of-which of Angst (the world) would go with the ‘already-in-a-world’ moment of care (on the grounds that already-being-in-a-world belongs to thrownness and facticity). We decided that the reading outlined above is more compelling, although Heidegger does not make it clear exactly what he has in mind.

Winter, Week 5 Meeting - Part I

2008-02-18T13:06:00.003-06:00

Understanding (§31)

We pointed out that understanding, like findingness, is a moment of dasein’s disclosedness, the ‘there’ where entities can show up intelligibly to dasein. Like findingness, understanding is a structural moment of being-in which discloses the ‘who’ and world of dasein simultaneously (or “equiprimordially”). Specifically, understanding discloses possibilities in terms of which entities are intelligible to dasein. Heidegger says that this sort of disclosedness has the structure of projection. In understanding, dasein ‘projects entities onto their possibilities.’ We also pointed out that understanding is a broader phenomenon than cognition or knowledge, and involves a practical competence or skill in everyday dealings with oneself, others and intraworldly entities. Finally, we discussed how understanding operates on the ontological level (disclosing the kind of being that characterizes dasein, equipment or things, in general) and on the ontic level (disclosing particular ways to be dasein, equipment or things).

Understanding discloses dasein’s being in terms of that for-the-sake-of-which dasein exists, dasein’s ability-to-be [Seinkönnen, MR: “potentiality-for-being”]. To say that dasein exists is to say that dasein is able to understand itself as whoever it is, for instance as an American, as a carpenter, as someone devoted to justice. We noticed that Heidegger does not say which sorts of things are supposed to count as ‘for-the-sake-of’s.

Understanding discloses the being of equipment in terms of the worldly structure of significance, letting the ready-to-hand show up intelligibly in terms of its usefulness and its relation to the surrounding equipmental totality, or context of co-equipment. Understanding discloses how entities can, and should, be used. For instance, books, in the world of working at the library, are disclosed in terms of the roles they play in shelving, browsing and borrowing, along with the other books, shelves, floors, call numbers, co-workers, the boss, and so on.

Finally, understanding discloses the being of things (present-at-hand entities), for example, in terms of the theoretical laws explaining how they can possibly behave. Physical law, for example, says that it’s possible for entities with mass to gravitate toward entities with greater mass.

We wondered whether the possibilities upon which we project entities are dasein-independent, since they seem to belong to the entities themselves – particularly for present-at-hand entities. What is possible and impossible for such entities is determined by the laws of nature, and it would seem that these hold regardless of whether there are cases of dasein around (for example, by the law of gravity it is impossible for the chalk to fall upwards). But the laws of nature, and the possibilities and impossibilities that they afford, are ways of making entities intelligible, and so require that there is an entity that makes intelligible: dasein. So while the chalk certainly wouldn't fall upwards in the absence of dasein, this wouldn’t ‘show up’ as an impossibility (since there would be no understanding dasein for them to show up to). We will discuss this kind of issue further when we read §43 on reality.

We also flagged the fact that understanding is always finding (and vice versa), and so that projection is always thrown. Among other things, this means that dasein is always thrown into a range of available possibilities upon which it can project entities (including itself). For example, because we are thrown into 20^th-century America, we can't understand ourselves as Samurai warriors, and we don't discover cicadas as edible.

Further, the entities themselves constrain the possibilities in terms of which they can be made intelligible – and this means that projection is not 'free-floating' but is beholden to entities and can get them right or wrong. Thus Nate could grasp the chalk as edible, but if he did so he would be getting the chalk wrong, and he gets the chalk right when he projects it onto its specific usability by writing on the blackboard with it.

This led us to discuss why Heidegger says that dasein tends to understand itself in terms of its world (and therefore misunderstand itself). We began to address this by discussing falling.

Winter, Week 5 Meeting - Part II

2008-02-18T13:04:00.003-06:00

Falling (§38)

Falling is a movement that belongs to thrownness – it is dasein's falling away from itself into the world and absorption in entities. This ‘away from’ is not a failure to be dasein, but is part of what it takes to be dasein. Kate suggested that we understand falling as like a drag on thrownness that connects dasein up with the world of entities. Note that the characterisation of being-in thus far has been primarily at the existential-ontological level, illuminating the being of dasein by showing how it discloses being. But being is always the being of entities, and dasein is the entity that discloses being (it is ontico-ontological). Falling is supposed to account for the fact that (i) dasein always takes place as an entity in each case, and (ii) its understanding of being is always the understanding of the being of entities.

Thus Heidegger says that falling “is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the ‘world’ of its concern” (SZ 175). This ‘alongside’ is an ‘absorption in …’. So falling involves being swept up in intraworldly entities. This begins to explain what it means to say that dasein falls away from itself. We recalled Heidegger's previous discussions of dasein's tendency to misunderstand itself as being just like the intraworldly entities that it deals with in the everyday world. In this misunderstanding, dasein loses its grip on the way in which it is different from other entities. So in being fallingly absorbed in its dealings with intraworldly entities, dasein misunderstands itself and in this sense falls away from itself.

We also noticed that in being absorbed in concernful dealings with entities, we typically discover them in the way that das Man does. This is because we are thrown, and so fall, into das Man. Human life wouldn't work if we came to it as blank slates and had to confront and discover entities by ourselves with nothing to go on. We always start from our tradition's ways of finding and understanding entities. For reasons that we will come to later (namely, death), das Man tends to cover over the way in which dasein is different from other entities. Thus das Man embodies and exacerbates dasein's fallen tendency to misunderstand, and so fall away from, itself.

Since falling is an existentiale, it must characterise dasein regardless of whether it is authentic or inauthentic. So the standard interpretation of falling as equivalent to both inauthenticity and everydayness cannot be correct. We found it difficult to discuss falling in a way that remained neutral between authentic and inauthentic falling, in part because Heidegger almost always talks about falling in its inauthentic mode, and never discusses authentic falling at length. This makes it hard to see what falling itself, and authentic falling, are. What is it to be authentically absorbed in the world of concern? or to be authentically determined by das Man?

Winter, Week 5 Meeting - Part III

2008-02-18T13:02:00.001-06:00

Authenticity and Inauthenticity (§38)

We know that both authentic and inauthentic cases of dasein fall, and that authentic dasein is not outside of or above everydayness. To help us understand this, Jim likened fallen everydayness to a basketball game. Any human life whatsoever happens on the court; to stop playing would be, according to this metaphor, to cease to exist (to be dasein) entirely. So both authentic and inauthentic cases of dasein are playing basketball (fall into everydayness), and the difference between them will consist in how they do so (authenticity as an existentiell modification of everydayness). We suggested that inauthentic dasein might be thought of as playing basketball without knowing or caring about what it takes to win, while authentic dasein would be playing to win.

Heidegger will discuss authenticity (but not authentic falling) in more detail in the opening chapters of Division II. By way of anticipation, we suggested that authenticity involves some kind of struggling against das Man-ish ways of disclosing. But since this struggle cannot culminate in stepping outside of das Man and everydayness, it must rather result in something like taking responsibility for the ways in which one discloses. Heidegger will further elaborate this in terms of crisis moments in which we confront our finitude: Angst, death, and conscience.

In contrast, inauthenticity involves an unquestioning absorption in entities and going along with das Man and its disclosedness (idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity). But we noted that this need not look like an unreflective or passive life – as Heidegger says, falling drives dasein to “exaggerated ‘self-dissection’” (SZ178). Thus inauthenticity can include even the philosopher who spends his/her life writing and thinking about human nature.

Winter, Week 5 Meeting - Part IV

2008-02-18T13:01:00.002-06:00

Idle Talk, Curiosity, Ambiguity (§35-37)

We concluded by connecting our discussion of falling and its in/authentic modes back to dasein’s everyday disclosedness in idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Even in philosophising, we may be engaged in nothing more than idle talk – just passing along philosophical catchphrases without fully appropriating what they make manifest. And since most of us are stuck in such everyday disclosedness, we’re pretty much all inauthentic. As much as we would like to consider ourselves authentic, on Heidegger’s account authenticity is exceedingly hard and rare.

Winter, Week 5 Meeting, Part V

2008-02-18T12:58:00.003-06:00

Conclusion

We didn’t talk about the section on discourse and language (§34), and we didn’t talk much about interpretation (§32) and assertion (§33). But now that we have most of the structural components of dasein’s being on the table, we will be going on to discuss the unity of these in ‘care’ via a discussion of the limit-experience of anxiety (§39-42).

Winter, Week 3 Meeting - Part I

2008-01-31T09:13:00.001-06:00

Admin

Reading for next time (2/7): §§31-38. If you can’t read everything, skip §33 (assertion) and, if you have to, §32 (interpretation). We’ll discuss these the least, if at all.

Winter, Week 3 Meeting - Part II

2008-01-31T09:10:00.000-06:00

I.V: Being-in and the There (§28)

We began by recalling the way in which being-in is unified with the 'who' (I.4) and 'world' (I.3) to form dasein's basic constitution: being-in-the-world. Nate drew John Haugeland's infamous coin diagram, which shows the who and world as two sides of a coin, the metal of which is being-in. We noted that the three structural moments of being-in (understanding, findingness and discourse) should each be understood as helping disclose both dasein’s ‘who’ and ‘world’ at the same time, since these are the two sides, faces or aspects of being-in. That is to say, things like moods (and, as we will see when we discuss understanding, possibilities) let both dasein and intraworldly entities show up. We compared this interrelation of dasein and its world, as illustrated in the coin diagram, to Heidegger's suggestion that if we insist on talking in terms of subject and object, then dasein is the being of the 'between' between the two (even though this can still carry misleading connotations of literal spatiality).

Being-in was introduced briefly in §12, which argued that it is not a spatial phenomenon (as if dasein were present inside something larger), and that it is manifest in engaged activities such as producing, attending, looking after, undertaking, considering. We briefly wondered whether these are cognitive phenomena, and decided that to the extent that they seem to be so, Heidegger will explain this feature in a way that does not appeal strictly to the mind or its acts. Heidegger's explanation of how such comportments towards entities are possible is in I.5, in which he outlines the structural features of dasein's very openness or being-there.

Da-sein is to be (sein) the there (da). We read the passage on SZ133 in which Heidegger introduces the there as the clearing or dasein's disclosedness. The key point is that dasein is not closed off like a Cartesian subject, but is open – indeed, it is openness. In other words, dasein is the 'space' or 'light' in which entities can show up or remain hidden. This openness is the there or the da. We suggested that the account of the structure of the there – of dasein's disclosedness – will be Heidegger's answer to traditional accounts of (self-)consciousness.

We listed several phrases Heidegger uses to try to characterize dasein’s being:

Dasein is the clearing (or being-lit-up).
Dasein is its disclosedness.
Dasein is its ‘there.’
The essence of dasein is existence (to be dasein is to exist).
To be its ‘there’ is (in each case) an issue for dasein.
Dasein is essentially constituted by being-in-the-world.

These all seem to exhibit a rough sense of equivalence, so that what we understand about one phenomenon (clearing, disclosedness, the there, existence, being-in-the-world, being an issue) should shed light on our understanding of the others.

Winter, Week 3 Meeting - Part III

2008-01-31T09:08:00.000-06:00

I.V: Thrownness (§29)

Dasein is thrown into the there. We read the introduction of thrownness on SZ 135, and saw that talk of dasein's thrownness "is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over." Delivered over to what? Starting with the difference between being raised on a farm and moving to a farm later in life, we suggested several different levels, or scopes, of thrownness: in each case, dasein is thrown into dealing with the entities that are there (e.g. the chairs that are in the classroom, the chalk that is here and the eraser that isn't), thrown into a particular body (e.g. one that's too short for the NBA), thrown into a particular point in its life (e.g. being a 20-something college student), thrown into a particular time, place and tradition (e.g. 21^st Century America), and ultimately thrown into being a case of dasein at all – being the kind of entity for which things are meaningful. We saw that it is a consequence of thrownness that some things are possible for us (e.g. being a college student) and some things are not possible (e.g. being a Samurai warrior). Finally, we noticed that Heidegger describes the 'whence' and 'whither' of the throw as obscure, and suggested that this obscurity is manifest in questions like, 'why am I here?', 'what is the meaning of life?', and 'where do I come from?', the answers to which seem ‘enigmatic’ and ‘shrouded in mystery.’

Winter, Week 3 Meeting - Part IV

2008-01-31T09:06:00.000-06:00

I.V: Findingness and Moods (§29, §30)

Thrownness is revealed in findingness. Findingness is a structural moment or element of being-in, which often manifests itself in the form of moods. When we are thrown into being-x, we find ourselves as x, and so as thrown into x. 'Findingness' is our preferred translation of Befindlichkeit, which M&R translate as 'state-of-mind'. 'State-of-mind' is profoundly misleading because what Heidegger means by Befindlichkeit is neither mental nor a state. (Alternative translations include 'attunement,' 'disposition,’ ‘disposedness’ and Haugeland’s ‘sofindingness’). Findingness is dasein's receptivity, its ability to "tune in", if you will, to the "vibes" that are there (thanks to Richard Polt for remembering the 60's).

Moods are modes or manifestations of findingness. Because of the German word he uses (Stimmung), Heidegger often thinks of moods in musical terms. They are like the soundtrack to one's life, and they constitute the framework or mise-en-scene within which things show up in a certain way. Thus moods are disclosive or uncovering. (In a film, when soft music is playing a stare shows up as an indication of affection, but with a different kind of music it can reveal resentment or imminent aggression). Moods uncover entities in the way they matter to dasein. We noticed that in the analysis of fear (§30), the three structural moments correspond to the three structural moments of being-in-the-world: in fearing (being-in), dasein is fearful for itself (the ‘who’) in the face of a fearsome entity (the world). This shows that, as Heidegger says, moods—and findingness in general—disclose the whole of being-in-the-world.

We recognised that moods are only one mode of findingness, and so that there are other modes – notably, perception or sensation. Further, what Heidegger means by 'mood' covers not only feelings or affects (joy, hate, fear, indifference etc), but more broadly one's general disposition (e.g. a cheerful disposition) and even the mood of a community or era (the Zeitgeist).

We discussed whether cases of dasein always find themselves thrown into a mood (roughly, whether moods are passive), given that it is possible to control one's mood and sometimes to effect a counter-mood. (Which, note, suggests that we are always in some mood or other.) We decided that even though we can perform activities to encourage a change in our mood, this amounts to a receptivity to a new mood rather than an active choice of mood.

Winter, Week 3 Meeting - Part V

2008-01-31T09:04:00.000-06:00

I.V: Understanding (§31)

We did not discuss Heidegger's analysis of understanding in §30, although we did note that understanding has to do with possibilities and is something like the 'active' or 'spontaneous' counterpart to the 'receptivity' of findingness. We will discuss this further next time.

Winter, Week 1 Meeting - Part I

2008-01-14T20:17:00.000-06:00

Admin

During the winter term, we will meet Thursdays 6:00-8:00 p.m., odd weeks, room TBA. Our next meeting will be on Thursday, January 24, and we will read §§28-31 of Division I, chapter 5.

Anyone who wasn’t at the meeting but still wants to continue with the group, please send either Nate (nsz at uchicago) or Kate (kwithy at uchicago) an e-mail, so that we can keep you on the e-mail list.

Finally, we’d like to let you be more involved in running the discussion group. There are two things you can help us with: First, you could volunteer to kick off the discussion, summarizing what you think are important points in the reading, pointing out passages that were confusing or tricky and seem worth discussing, drawing a chart on the board, asking a general or comparative question about the topic in the reading, etc. Second, you could volunteer to note down what we discuss in our group meeting and write the main points up for posting on the blog. You can volunteer for either by posting a comment here.

Winter, Week 1 Meeting - Part II

2008-01-14T19:12:00.000-06:00

Situating I.IV

We began our discussion by recalling the place of this chapter in the structure of Division I: we are investigating dasein as being-in-the-world; I.III analysed the world, I.V will cover being-in, and I.IV discusses ‘who’ (not ‘what’) it is that is in the everyday world.

Last time, we saw that not just equipment, but also other cases of dasein show up within the work-world. How, then, do they show up? We charted the ontological structures common to both equipment and others (click the chart to see it full-size):

Winter, Week 1 Meeting - Part III

2008-01-14T19:06:00.000-06:00

I.IV: Being-with and dasein-with (§26)

Others are encountered from out of the work-world, and they are encountered as dasein – more specifically, in their being as dasein-with (Mitdasein). I share my everyday world with these others, which is accordingly a with-world (Mitwelt). This is possible because dasein is essentially being-with (Mitsein) – being-with(-others) is an existentiale; it is part of what it takes to be dasein. Thus being-with is “autonomous” and “irreducible,” and Heidegger does not face the problem of other minds – it’s impossible to make sense of oneself as dasein without already being able to make sense of others as cases of dasein, too.

We wondered about the sense of ‘with’ at issue here – is it that (i) a carpenter can only be a carpenter if there are others to purchase tables, produce hammers and so on (playing the other roles that make up the whole context of carpentry), or that (ii) a carpenter can only be a carpenter if there are other carpenters, such that the social role of ‘carpenter’ is available in the first place? We decided that both were involved in being-with others in a with-world. Recall that the with-which of equipment-use has to do with the other equipment involved in the relevant, purposive context (the nails and boards that go along with the hammer, say). This supports the idea that ‘with’ in ‘being-with’ has to do with other roles in the relevant context of existence (the carpenter’s boss, customers and co-workers, say). At the same time, being-with is supposed to capture the normativity involved in existence, the way that one’s way of life can be shared and lived in a common, standard manner. This supports the idea that ‘with’ in ‘being-with’ has to do with the possibility that (numerically) more than one case of dasein be able to live any particular way of life.

We briefly discussed being-alone as illuminating being-with: being-alone is not the opposite of being-with(-others), but a deficient mode of it that is possible only if dasein is essentially being-with. The reason is that being-alone is to be understood as being-with others in the mode of indifference or not mattering – which is also why the mere presence of more others doesn’t change one’s being-alone (one can be equally alone on a crowded bus as in an isolation chamber).

Finally, we flagged that, just as others are usually understood in terms of the work world, and so in terms of what they do, so too I typically understand myself in terms of what I do.

Winter, Week 1 Meeting - Part IV

2008-01-14T18:59:00.000-06:00

I.IV: Das Man (§27)

We began by noting that the various English translations of ‘das Man’ – ‘the They,’ ‘the One,’ ‘the Anyone’ – each have drawbacks. In particular, ‘the They’ implies that it refers to everyone else but me, whereas das Man is something to which I belong, and ‘the One’ implies that it refers to just one, perhaps exemplary, entity, whereas das Man is someone whom anyone and everyone can be (and usually is).

We wondered about the extent to which das Man is the same as, or coextensive with, societies or communities. We noted that there will be overlapping das Man structures at various levels – i.e., norms that govern being at the U of C, living in Hyde Park, being an American, being an international academic, etc.

Das Man is the ‘who’ of everyday being-in-the-world, the ‘subject’ of everydayness. In my everyday life, I am a ‘they-self.’ As a they-self, I am not my authentic self. We briefly discussed some of the difficulties in making sense of this: the authentic self is in some way opposed to das Man, and yet Heidegger enigmatically says that it is an “existentiell modification” of it. Indeed, das Man is an existentiale, so authentic cases of dasein will not be removed from, apart from, or in opposition to das Man.

We suggested that what is distinctive about being authentic has to do with taking responsibility, rather than going against social norms (although sometimes this can be part of taking responsibility). This conclusion came out of discussing tricky examples of ‘firsts’—when someone creates and/or wears the first pair of shoes, when someone becomes the first lawmaker of the Wild West, when someone first comes up with a revolutionary theory. These cases are difficult to situate in terms of das Man. On the one hand, there is something new and unprecedented in such activity, so they look like examples of bucking (or creating) social norms. On the other hand, such phenomena as shoes, law in the West and, say, quantum physics, don’t come into view until they are possibilities for dasein, which is to say, until they are ways to exist, or equipment with which to exist, that can be shared by more than one case of dasein (this is part of the point in saying that being-with is an existentiale). We brought out this latter point by reflecting that even the Wild West bandit is governed by a set of social norms, and can only occur in a social context in which such banditry is possible, for instance where there is already a sheriff to be riled up. Again, this led us to think of authenticity less in terms of creating new ways to live ex nihilo, and more in terms of taking responsibility for maintaining or modifying those ways of living already available and intelligible within one’s world.

Winter Quarter Meetings

2007-12-04T16:23:00.000-06:00

We will continue to meet every two weeks throughout the winter quarter to finish Division I of Being and Time. We will be sending out an email over the break to figure out our meeting times and days (at least for the first meeting).

If you lack for reading material over the break, you could check out some introductory books on BT. We recommend these:

Happy Holidays!
Kate and Nate

Autumn, Week 10 Meeting

2007-12-04T15:00:00.000-06:00

At this meeting we discussed the world, worldhood and equipment. We began with a restatement of Heidegger's concept of world in plain language: "[A] world is a system of purposes and meanings that organises our activities and our identity, and within which entities can make sense to us" (Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction, p54). We then considered:

1. The four senses of world (§14):

(a) 'World' means a totality of present-at-hand entities. We suggested understanding this sense of 'world' in terms of 'what's there.' We debated what would count as examples of intraworldly entities in this sense, and considered material objects, numbers, spaces and unicorns. While we didn't come to a consensus about them all, we did agree that material objects count as a good example of 'what's there' in this sense of 'world.'

(b) 'World' means the being of intraworldly entities. We suggested understanding this sense of 'world' in terms of 'what could be there.' We glossed this sense in terms of a set of constraints, rules or possibilities for being an entity in the realm or domain in question. We talked about Euclid's axioms as an example of this sense of world, since they give the rules by which we can make sense of, and know about, geometrical entities.

(c) 'World' means that wherein a factical dasein lives. We suggested understanding this sense of 'world' as the 'lived world' or 'lifeworld,' and had an extensive discussion of the 'world of stacking (books in the library)' as an example of this sense of world. We pointed out that this is a world in which entities show up both publicly (a 'we-world,' constituted by social practices) and meaningfully (a world of significance). We noted Heidegger's description of this sense of world as being that which is closest to us, the everyday environment surrounding us. We also noted a parallel between Heidegger's use of 'present-at-hand' in his description of the first sense of 'world' and his use of 'factical' in his description of the third sense of 'world.' On this parallel, 'factical dasein' would seem to mean a dasein that's 'there.' (Note: Heidegger will expound upon this sense of 'there' in I.5.)

(d) 'World' means worldhood, the "a priori character" of any world, in general--what belongs to, or makes sense of, a world, insofar as it is a world.

We noted that Heidegger's use of 'being-in-the-world' as another term for dasein's existence uses 'world' in the third sense. We also went on to discuss the third and fourth senses of 'world' in more detail, as summarized in the numbered points below.

2. We noticed that the phenomenon of the world is usually overlooked because it is so close to us that it's difficult to see, like a pair of glasses. Heidegger's analysis of the world, then, is phenomenological in this sense: it attempts to allow the world, which normally hides itself in its very obviousness, to show itself. Heidegger starts with our closest, everyday world (the environment, an example of the third sense of 'world') and with the entities we encounter in it (equipment, or ready-to-hand entities). (§14, §15) Heidegger describes our life in this world as our "dealings" with the ready-to-hand (and, we noted later, with other people who share this world, too). He refers to such dealings with the term 'concern,' and he calls the sort of understanding by which we can make sense of our world and the entities in it 'circumspection' (a conception of understanding which uses the metaphor of sight, like our phrases 'now I see,' 'see what I mean,' 'point of view,' 'shed light on,' and so on).

3. Using the example of the world of stacking, we considered what it is to be an entity in this world (again, an entity Heidegger calls 'equipment' and 'ready-to-hand'). A book shows up as an entity in the world of stacking by making sense in terms of the activity of stacking (the living of the stacker's way of life, so to speak). Heidegger discusses the being of equipment by pointing out a number of interconnected structures in terms of which the book makes sense as an entity in the world of stacking. The overall name for this structure is the 'in-order-to' structure. The book shows up in the world of stacking because it's used in order to shelve and arrange the library's collection. The in-order-to structure has three related components. (a) The book shows up in terms of the role it plays in the activity of stacking. Heidegger calls this kind of usefulness the 'in-which' of the book's readiness-to-hand. (b) The book shows up as that which the stacker stacks; Heidegger calls this the 'with-which' of the book's readiness-to-hand. We noted that the book itself only makes sense within the larger context of other equipment involved in stacking: the stacks themselves, the stacker, the stacker's co-workers and boss, library browsers, the library's floors and rooms and building, call numbers, carts, etc. Strictly speaking, all these together constitute the with-which element of the in-order-to structure, here. (c) The book shows up as being useful for a certain task, used toward a certain purpose, in this case, keeping the collection organized so browsers can find it. Heidegger calls the purpose of a piece of equipment's role the 'towards-which' of its readiness-to-hand. We noted that the in-order-to structure, particularly when we consider the 'towards-which' element, points to, or refers to (or, Heidegger says, "signifies") further 'in-order-to' structures. For example, the book is useful in order to organize the collection, which itself is in useful in order for, say, the stacker to keep her job and continue to get paid, which is in order to fulfill work-study requirements, in order to keep getting financial aid, in order to stay in college, in order to get a degree, in order to be a chemist. (§15, §16, §18)

4. We noted that this last 'in-order-to' is special, and distinct from the others. Strictly speaking, Heidegger doesn't call it an 'in-order-to' relation; he calls it a 'for-the-sake-of' relation. All the work of stacking ultimately makes sense insofar as it's done for the sake of being able to live in the world in question. In this sense, dasein's existence--while it only makes sense in terms of the world and equipment in which and with which it exists--ultimately makes sense as something for the sake of its ability to be, a possibility of its being (for example, being a stacker, earning money for nourishment, being a chemist). Dasein's 'for-the-sake-of-which' is something like a 'life-project', a way of being around which someone organises his life. One's for-the-sake-of-which will determine, and make sense of, the activities one engages in and the ready-to-hand entities that one encounters (e.g. books, banks, test tubes--which themselves make sense in terms of the in-order-to relation). (§15, §18)

5. The upshot of points (4) and (5) above is that to be a case of dasein is always to use equipment or encounter ready-to-hand entities (equipment), and ready-to-hand entities only make sense with reference to that ability-to-be, for-the-sake-of-which dasein exists. Thus to understand either dasein or intraworldly entities, we have to make reference to both. This is one way in which we can see Heidegger overcoming a Cartesian-style subject / object split, which is a way of thinking about people and entities that simply doesn't illuminate our everyday dealings with entities in the environment (because it doesn't let these phenomena show up intelligibly).

6. Finally, we saw that worldhood (the 'worldly' character of the world, what makes it count as a world) is the structure of all these references or relations. To be a 'world' in the fourth sense, to be worldly or 'world-ish,' is to make sense in terms of the in-order-to and for-the-sake of relations. Heidegger's term for this overall structure, the structure of a world as such, is 'significance.'

7. We noted a few more details about Heidegger's view of equipment. Items of equipment have appropriate and inappropriate uses. Thus a book is used appropriately for stacking, reading and so on, but used inappropriately for hammering. Of course, the book can be used in order to hammer, but this does not make it a hammer. It is a book used inappropriately, as a hammer. (§15) The phenomenon of appropriate and inappropriate uses of equipment shows that in using equipment, we also encounter the public world which determines such appropriate and inappropriate uses. Not only does a piece of equipment only show up by fitting intelligibly into a larger context of equipment all involved in that world, a case of dasein only makes sense of itself as a denizen of its world by encountering other cases of dasein with whom it shares that world (e.g., the boss, other stackers, browsers and borrowers). We need not literally see these other people and entities; rather, they are implied, and so show up for us, insofar as the very activity of stacking books makes sense, at all. (§15). The entities encountered in our dealings with equipment always imply or refer to a larger context of other entities, practices and norms. If this context is different (e.g., purchasing books in a bookstore rather than checking them out of the library), then the item of equipment shows up to us differently, it plays a different role in the in-order-to structure of its world. Items of equipment, or entities that are ready-to-hand, are what they are only in terms of their place in such a context or totality of references. (§15, §16)

8. Finally, Kate suggested that while in the case of the work-world or environment, these references will be the in-order-to and so on, Heidegger's mention of primitive man (§17) implies that there may be worlds where we are not primarily concerned with using things (perhaps: the religious world, the art world, the intellectual world). These will be worlds insofar as they are referential totalities (i.e. have worldhood), but will have different kinds of references than the work-world.

Autumn, Week 8 Meeting

2007-11-20T13:58:00.000-06:00

NB: The reading for next time is I.3 (§14-§24). We will focus on §14-18. We will not be talking about the sections on Descartes (§19-21), and will probably not talk about the sections on spatiality (§22-§24) (which are nonetheless well worth reading).

1. We began with the question of method in raising the question of being. The method of ontology is phenomenology (§7c), which is: letting that which shows itself (the phenomenon) be seen from itself in the way in which it shows itself from itself. Phenomenology is a descriptive method, does not make assumptions, and is a special kind of seeing.

We saw that phenomenology is the method appropriate to ontology because being is the phenomenon par excellance – it does not usually show itself since it lies hidden in entities, so it needs to be allowed to show itself. Being shows itself only through entities, and does so particularly in dasein. So phenomenological ontology must begin with the analysis of dasein's being (the existential analytic). This analysis starts with dasein's everydayness (§9, §5) – its ordinary, everyday going about its life – rather than with any special or extraordinary situation.

We discussed the hermeneutic or interpretive character of the existential analytic. How does an interpretation of dasein's being connect to the ordinary understanding of hermeneutics as textual analysis? We did not reach a satisfactory answer. But we did note that in carrying out the existential analytic, we figure out how to proceed as we proceed. So perhaps this issue will become more clear as we read further.

2. We tried to get a sense for what Heidegger means by existence (§9), particularly in relation to dasein's understanding of being and the fact that being is an issue for it. We recognised that only dasein exists, and contrasted existence with presence-at-hand, which is an appropriate term for the being of entities unlike dasein. We suggested that existence may have to do with the activity or the act of be-ing (as opposed to the passivity of the present-at-hand), but worried about the appropriateness of this vocabulary. We noted that existence has to do with ability and possibility, but did not discuss further what 'possibility' means.

Heidegger scholars do not agree on what Heidegger means by 'existence.' We mentioned Kate's preferred reading (that existence is dasein's ek-sistent standing-outside-of-itself in understanding being), and John Haugeland's reading (that existence is the actuality of dasein's being lived by people in each case). We tried to draw a parallel between Heidegger's terms (existence, facticity, (falling)) and the traditional terms 'existentia' (that-being), 'essentia' (what-being) (and 'accident,' how-being). Is such a parallel appropriate? Is Heidegger in some way collapsing the traditional distinction between existentia and essentia?

3. We distinguished dasein in general from cases of dasein, on analogy with tuberculosis. Like tuberculosis, dasein always occurs in particular cases – that is, in each case (je). (The translators are sloppy in including this 'in each case' in their translation.) Cases of dasein are addressed by personal pronouns ('I am', 'you are'), so are probably people. Thus you and I are not daseins, but are cases of dasein. Accordingly, cases of dasein can each say that dasein is 'mine' ("dasein is in each case mine"). As a feature of dasein in general, this is called 'mineness' (Jemeinigkeit) (§9).

4. We saw that dasein can be mine in different ways: authentically or inauthentically (§9). Thus cases of dasein (people) can be authentic or inauthentic. We noted that Heidegger will spend the bulk of the book talking about authenticity and inauthenticity – but lamented his failure to provide examples. By way of rough orientation: Jesus and Socrates are uncontroversially authentic cases of dasein; for inauthenticity we can have in mind someone like 'the man in the suit who buys in to the system.' But need authentic and inauthentic cases of dasein be recognisably different? (Kate recommended Jonathan Lear's recent book, Radical Hope, for a brilliant portrayal of an authentic case of dasein).

We did not discuss much what it takes to be in/authentic, but did note that it has to do with (not) 'winning' or 'choosing' oneself, and suggested that this has to do with taking over or owning up to being dasein. We saw that inauthenticity is not a lesser or lower degree of being than is authenticity – unlike in Plato's Republic, in which the beautiful city is in some sense more real than other cities.

5. We distinguished the fact of dasein's being-present – its facticity – from the factual being-present of present-at-hand entities (§12). Facticity is dasein's concrete determination in each case – the details and particularities that fill out and make up any particular human life. Heidegger's will later say that 'existence is always factical,' which means that dasein's existence always happens or occurs in and as the living of a particular, determinate life. We wondered what it means to say that dasein's 'destiny' is bound up with the being of entities which encounter it in the world, and suggested that this may have to do with the fact that what kind of life you lead and what is possible for you is bound up with what kinds of entities happen to be part of your world.

6. We saw that dasein's basic state of being is being-in-the-world (§12). ('State' is not to be understood as something like a 'mental state,' or as optional or contingent. Rather, being-in-the-world is an aspect of dasein's constitution or structure, its make-up). We discussed the way in which being-in-the-world is an articulated unity (somewhat like an aeroplane), such that its parts can be considered separately but are not actually separable, and so must always be considered in terms of the whole. The following three chapters of Being and Time are organised around an investigation of each of the three aspects of being-in-the-world.

We distinguished being-in as such from a spatial relationship of insideness, illuminating this by way of Heidegger's claim that present-at-hand entities can never 'touch' each other. Only dasein can touch something qua encountering it, since only dasein is in the world in the right way. We further illuminated being-in by considering its basic mode, being-amidst-the-world. (We rejected the translation of bei as 'alongside' on the grounds that it implies a spatial separation, opting for 'amidst' instead). We saw that to be amidst the world is to be absorbed in it, and considered Heidegger's list of examples (having to do with, undertaking, considering, etc.) (SZ, p. 56). This list covers both 'practical' and 'theoretical' activities, which indicates that being-in is supposed to precede and ground the practical-theoretical distinction. But the list does not include perceiving and knowing, which are the traditional ways in which the human being's engagement with the world is expressed. This led us to a discussion of knowing.

7. The standard picture of knowledge (§13) is that it is the relation between a subject and an object which somehow meet up. We saw that Heidegger holds that knowing is possible as a relation to entities only when we hold back from our concernful engagement with them. This holding back allows us to just look at entities, and to see them as merely present-at-hand objects. Heidegger considers traditional epistemology to be grounded in the forgetting of the fact that this mere looking is based on our being-amidst-the-world.

Finally, we mentioned Heidegger's response to the objection that his notion of being-in-the-world presupposes that the knowing subject connects up with the world, and does not explain how this is possible. Heidegger responds by saying that it is not clear that such an explanation is needed at all, and that such an approach is flawed because it is 'constructivist' – it tries to conjoin two items, subject and world, instead of recognising the original unity of dasein and world in dasein's being-in-the-world.

Autumn, Week 6 Meeting

2007-11-05T08:43:00.000-06:00

Here's a summary of our discussion from last Thursday:

1. Dasein (§4, §5)

a. By way of review, we recalled that dasein is the entity to be interrogated in asking the question of the meaning of being, since it is the entity that understands both its own being and the being of other entities. We made a list of things that Heidegger says about dasein: it has to do with man or human beings; we are, each of us, dasein; it's the entity that inquires; it has possibilities; it has discourse; it has the potentiality for logos; it's something for whom being is an issue; it relates to its being; it tends to understand its being in terms of the world; it is ontically near but ontologically far; it's not quite the same as what's traditionally called the 'subject' in philosophy.

b. We saw that 'Dasein' is an ordinary German word meaning 'existence,' and literally means 'being (sein) there (da).'

c. We proposed that dasein is distinct from other entities because it reflects on or thinks about itself, how it should live, what it is, and so on. But we worried that understanding this self-relation as 'reflection' or 'thinking' might define dasein in a way that cuts it off from ordinary life and going about in the world. We related this to the idea that dasein's being is an issue for it – that its being is caught up in some kind of questionability.

d. We talked about what it means to say that dasein's being is existence, and noticed that this is different from other statements of the human 'essence.' We did not reach a satisfactory interpretation of what 'existence' means. In particular, we wondered whether the claim that dasein "has its being to be" just means that dasein is, or whether this is an Aristotelian claim that says that dasein must become what it is in the sense of satisfying its function or fully realising its essence. Similarly, we wondered about what it means to say that dasein has the possibility to be itself or not be itself, and tentatively related this to the idea of people existing 'authentically' or 'inauthentically' (without defining these terms). We wondered if this was an ethical or moral claim, or something else entirely.

e. We reached an interpretation of the terms 'existentiell' and 'existential,' deciding that the existential describes ontological questions, investigations and claims about the being of dasein in general, while the existentiell describes cases of Dasein as entities living out their own particular lives in each case. We looked at the following paraphrases of the terms, by re-arranging Heidegger's words at the end of Being and Time, §3: The existential is 'the character of an understanding of the context [Zusammenhang, hanging together] of the structures that constitute existence,' the existentiell is 'the understanding of oneself which leads along the way of deciding one's existence (by taking hold or neglecting).'

f. We acknowledged that dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being is not a set of beliefs, but is embodied in practices. For example, our understanding of what it is to be masculine or feminine is not a set of beliefs so much as the particular ways in which we speak, act, move, and carry out our lives. We talked about the claim that ontology cannot simply take over dasein's pre-ontological understanding, since dasein has a tendency to misunderstand its own being and because its understanding is always filtered through a tradition and that tradition's ways of understanding being, which may not be suitably grounded in the phenomena. So we can't just make assumptions about what it is to be dasein. We saw that this is why the existential analytic – the analysis of dasein's way of being – is necessary for Heidegger's project.

2. Being and Time

We talked about what kind of results Heidegger will come to in this text, and in particular the fact that they will not be free-floating assertions or slogans. We noticed that Heidegger ends the book with a series of questions rather than a set of claims. We related this to his talk of phenomenology, and the idea that what he is trying to do is to make something manifest to us, to show us something.

3. The Phenomenon (§7a)

a. We talked about the phenomenon as the self-showing (that which shows itself in itself and from itself). We wondered whether something might show itself to one person in one way and to another in a different way, and so what the criterion is for a phenomenon showing up adequately, correctly or truthfully. We distinguished the phenomenon from:

i. Semblance, which shows itself, but not as it is in itself. We gave the example of the sun, which seems to move around the earth.
ii. Appearance, which does not show itself but is announced or indicated by something else, which does show itself. We gave the example of the Black Death, which does not show itself but is announced by black lumps, which do show themselves.
iii. Mere appearance, which does not show itself from itself. We mentioned, but did not fully discuss, this.

We noticed that the concept of phenomenon underlies semblance, appearance and mere appearance, since these all involve something showing itself. They are each distinguished from the phenomenon because they lack one of its components (showing itself, in itself, from itself).

b. We worried that under certain descriptions, the example of the sun can demonstrate either semblance or appearance (or even mere appearance). We pointed out that Heidegger is here not so interested in perfectly distinguishing these three from one another (and indeed allows them to overlap), but is trying to distinguish all three from the phenomenon as the self-showing.

4. Logos (§7b)

a. We noted that logos is a kind of telling or discourse. We looked at these four features Heidegger points out about logos: (i) It lets a phenomenon show up, (ii) it lets something show up in a public way, in a way that communicates, (iii) it lets something show up as something, and (iv) it uncovers entities, taking them out of their hiddenness and into the truth.

b. We flagged the fact that while we know that discourse or logos is speaking when it is fully concrete, we don't really know what it is. Heidegger will discuss it fully later.

c. We noticed Heidegger's brief discussion of truth in this section, which describes truth as discovery or making manifest and falsity as deceiving or covering up. We wondered about the criteria for this – how we can be sure that something is made manifest as it is?

d. We mentioned that Heidegger derives the traditional interpretations or translations of 'logos' ('reason,' 'judgment,' 'concept,' 'definition,' 'ground,' 'relationship') from his own interpretation of it as letting something be seen.

5. We did not talk about temporality as the meaning of dasein's being and as the horizon for all understanding of being (§5). We did not talk about the destruction of the history of ontology and why this is necessary for Heidegger's project (§6), although we did note that Heidegger does not get to this portion of the planned text. Finally, we did not put Heidegger's accounts of the phenomenon and of logos together into his concept of phenomenology (§7c), but will talk about this next time.

Dreyfus' Being and Time Course Online

2007-10-20T12:31:00.000-05:00

Thanks to a comment from Demographer, I've learned that Hubert Dreyfus is making recordings of his 2007 Heidegger class at Berkeley available online. You can subscribe to the podcast as well as download mp3s of the individual class meetings.

Check it out here.

Autumn, Week 4 Meeting

2007-10-19T12:13:00.000-05:00

At Thursday's meeting, we covered a lot of ground, but also went very quickly. Unfortunately, that will probably be the norm for a two-hour, bi-weekly meeting about a lot of difficult text. But the blog is a place to continue the discussion and ask new questions that you didn't get to ask at the meeting, or that have occurred to you since the meeting.

We talked about:

1. The difference between entities (das Seiendes, the things that are) and being (das Sein, that in virtue of which they are as they are, that on the basis of which we understand entities as entities), and why being is not an entity (§2, §3).

2. The difference between ontic inquiry (which asks questions about entities, usually particular ones, e.g., the sciences) and ontological inquiry (which asks questions about the being of those entities) (§3). We further distinguished between regional ontology (which works out the basic concepts of being for entities of a particular sort, for instance, what it means to be a natural entity, or a physical one, or a historical one), on the one hand, and on the other hand, fundamental ontology (which works out the basic concepts of being for any entity whatsoever, asks what it means to be, in general).

We considered several answers to the question, 'What is the relationship between ontological claims and ontic ones?'. We suggested that ontological claims and concepts might have some sort of foundational relationship to ontic claims, grounding them in some way or other (which we didn't work out much further). We also suggested that the ontological claims answer a 'how possible?' question with regard to the ontic claims, explaining how it's possible to be, say, a physical entity, by giving the conceptual framework in terms of which our claims about physical entities are intelligible, make sense to us. We also wondered whether our discoveries at the ontological level, including, but not limited to, conceptual change brought about in a scientific revolution, might influence and change the claims we make on the ontic level, or whether, by contrast, the work we do to clarify and make explicit our ontological concepts is for the sole purpose of bringing us to understand our ontic claims better, even though we already do understand them to some degree (since, for instance, we can do physics, even if we might not have a completely worked out account of the being of physical entities).

This question was left hanging somewhat open, along with a corresponding question about the relationship between claims of fundamental ontology and claims of regional ontology. Is there a similar relationship of founding, making possible or intelligible, influencing or clarifying, between our claims about being in general and our claims about being an entity in a particular region of being?

3. The being question as a question not about semantics, but about what makes the difference between something that is and something that is not – that is, about what is going on when we relate to an entity as something that is. We also discussed (and, to a certain extent, experienced) the being question as a question that needs to be reawakened (Preface, §1).

4. The three dogmas about being – universality, indefinability, self-evidence (§1). These are theses that Heidegger points out to motivate his project of reawakening the question of being. We pointed out that the first two theses are connected, since the universality and indefinability of the notion of being both have to do with the fact that being (according to Heidegger) doesn't admit of analysis or determination by way of a genus and specific difference. Several people asked and tried to answer the difficult question why being is not a genus, a question also posed as, 'Why is being not a property?'. It was difficult to find a knock-down explanation, so this issue was also left somewhat open. We considered that for Aristotle, there are senses of being that have nothing to do with a genus/specific difference analysis, such as being possible vs. actual, being true vs. false, and being essential vs. accidental. If we agree that all these distinctions have something to do with being, then we might feel a philosophical urge to work out an account of what they all have in common with regard to the notion of being in general, as a whole. The issue of genus and specific difference, by contrast, only applies to the sense of being expressed by our use of categories such as number, color, human, quantity, quality, etc. Again, this discussion was interesting and provocative, but left inconclusive in the interest of time.

5. The formal structure of the being question – what is asked about, what is to be found out, that which is to be interrogated, as well as the fact that our seeking is guided beforehand by what is sought (the pre-ontological understanding of being) (§2). We mentioned Heidegger's claim that we ask the question about the meaning of being from within some everyday, pre-ontological way that we already understand what it means to be; in this sense, the question of being is "guided beforehand by what is sought." We made an analogy between a police investigation and the investigation into the meaning of being, in that both can be understood as asking about something, interrogating something and asking after something it seeks to find out. We found places in the text where Heidegger fills out each of those formal aspects for his own investigation into being: What it asks about is being (the being of entities, that in terms of which they are already understood and determined as they entities they are); what it interrogates are entities (especially, some people presaged, the entity called 'dasein,' which we did not discuss much in our meeting); what it asks after and seeks to find out is the meaning of being (we are looking for something that seems to count as a meaning, and for something that shows up in a special way, distinct from the way that entities show up, since – one of the points Heidegger is most adamant about – being is not an entity).

6. We did not discuss the reason that dasein has an ontical, ontological and 'ontico-ontological' priority with respect to the question of being, why dasein is the specific entity we interrogate first when we seek to clarify the meaning of being. That is, we did not discuss why fundamental ontology proceeds through the existential analytic (analysis of existence) (§4). We also did not talk about what dasein is, although this can be vexing and will probably be a live issue throughout the reading group. We also did not distinguish 'existentiell' and 'existential,' nor explain what it means to say that dasein's way of being is 'existence'.

* * *

Anyone is free to ask about or try to give a take on any of the issues left unresolved at the meeting. You can do this through the comments link below. We encourage you to continue discussion with each other outside our meetings on campus, especially through this blog. The best way to make sense of a text, beyond oral discussion, is to write something about it, whether that's by attempting to give an explanation of a term, claim or problem from the text, or simply writing about what confuses you or what doesn't make sense in the text or discussion. We have posted the blog in hopes of encouraging writing about, and thereby developing and refining, our ideas.

(Finally, note that we are changing rooms next meeting. We'll meet from 5:00-7:00 on November 1st in Cobb 102.)

Greek and Latin in the Introduction

2007-10-16T07:48:00.000-05:00

I found two helpful pdfs that provide translations for the Greek and Latin terms in Heidegger's introduction. These are done by Dennis Beach of the College of Saint Benedict/Saint John's University, for his philosophy course on Heidegger. You can find the terms in §1 and §4 here and, for your later reading, the terms in §7 here.

If you want to ask questions or discuss these terms with the group, you can use the comments link at the end of this post.

Organizational Meeting

2007-10-08T21:46:00.000-05:00

10/4 Organisational Meeting

1. Introductions

2. Description of the group: the group is not a class; we will not be teaching Being and Time (SZ). Rather, it will be a guided discussion in which we figure it out together and compare different interpretations. You will be expected to have read the assigned text and to be prepared to discuss it. You need not have understood it, but should be able to ask intelligible questions about what you don't understand.

3. Why read SZ? Group discussion. Mentioned: those who Heidegger influenced; the differences between 'early' Heidegger and 'later' Heidegger; the phenomenological method; the incompleteness of SZ (we have 1/3 of the planned text); the topics covered in SZ: tool use, the world, society and conformity, understanding, moods, death, angst, conscience, time; the question of SZ as the question of what it means to be and its relation to time, given that 'to be' is most generally understood as 'to be present'. We also read the preface to SZ aloud.

4. Reading schedule handed out:

5. Translations: Macquarrie and Robinson translation preferred over Stambaugh.