Spring, Week 9 Meeting

The Final Meeting

For our final meeting, the fates (aka the Social Science division) threw a party for us, with food and beer and a live band! So we: sat out on the grass, drank beer and ate burgers and brownies and chips. We talked about: how we felt reading §83 (the last section), Heidegger's philosophical reasons for ending with questions, the hermeneutic circle, how temporality is supposed to count as an explanation of dasein's being and being in general, whether §83 takes back the project or transitions to the next Division, the incompleteness of SZ, whether ontology requires an ontic basis, the motto 'ways, not works,' the so-called 'turn' in Heidegger's thinking (from dasein to being), whether Heidegger recants the project of SZ or builds on it in his later thinking, what it means for authentic cases of dasein to be prepared to take back resolutions, whether Heidegger must be authentic to write SZ, whether we must be authentic to read it, whether SZ is therapeutically designed to make us authentic, whether the text teaches us how to read it, Strauss, the Heidegger / Carnap affair, what it means to say that "the nothing nothings," the distinction between Heidegger's 'What is Metaphysics?' (1929), Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) and Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929), congratulations to Jim on his award!, congratulations to Nathana on her award!, what we were like in high school, the tendency to treat being as a cosmic entity distinct from dasein, the fact that being or intelligibility escapes, in part, our will and choice, our fundamental passivity with respect to being, uncanniness (Kate's dissertation), transcendental arguments (Nate's dissertation), the coming (oil) apocalypse, das Man in a post-apocalyptic society, what is das Man anyway?, whether das Man understands itself as without beginning or end, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, das Man's flight from death, why dasein tends to understand being as presence-at-hand, the band's lyrics (referring to illegal immigrants and terrorists having the blues), the significance and datability of world-time – appropriate and inappropriate times for activities, the difference between world-time and 'now-time' (or 'ordinary time'), Jim's dad, the extent to which authenticity involves a radical relationship to das Man, whether Plenty Coups was sufficiently dissatisfied, the relationship between authenticity and action, how to be environmentally authentic, the crisis in women's history described in a paper that floated by on the wind.

Thanks to everyone who did the reading, came to the meetings, asked tough philosophical questions and suggested interpretations of the text. We really enjoyed getting to know you and getting to know Heidegger better as a group, and are excited about the possibility of doing something similar next year. We all seemed to have learned a lot and gained a greater appreciation for Being and Time. Good luck finishing up the year and have a fun summer!

Spring, Week 7 Meeting -- Part I

Where Are We?

We started out again by looking back over Being and Time as a whole, this time in order to situate Heidegger’s discussion of temporality within the context of his overarching philosophical project. We recalled that the goal of the book is to reawaken the question of the sense of being, and we pointed out that it’s debatable whether Heidegger’s ultimate intention is to answer that question or simply to explain how the question is intelligible and important to ask, whatever its answer turns out to be.

To achieve his goal, Heidegger first has to do fundamental ontology, and his discussion of temporality is the culmination of this intermittent step in the overarching argument. Fundamental ontology shows how any ontology (any understanding and meaningfulness of being) is possible at all, by explaining the origin of this possibility in terms of the being of dasein, the entity that understands being. It consists in an existential analytic of dasein, which is an interpretation of that entity’s being in terms of the articulated and unified ontological structure which makes it intelligible as the entity it is. This interpretation is phenomenological, which is to say it looks at our everyday, pre-thematic and pre-ontological understanding of being from a certain point of view, the view provided by the two ‘guiding clues’ or ‘formal indications’ Heidegger gives at the beginning of his treatise (in I.1): (1) the essence of dasein is its existence and (2) dasein’s being, which is always an issue for it, is in-each-case-mine [jemeinig]. These clues orient the phenomenological interpretation of being-in-the-world in terms of the ‘who’ of dasein, dasein’s world, and being-in (I.2-I.5), and Heidegger’s discussion of those structural moments bring dasein’s being into the fore-structure for the existential analytic’s phenomenological interpretation, as the structure of care (I.6). Heidegger finishes fleshing out the fore-structure by explaining how dasein is a whole and exists authentically in anticipatory resoluteness (II.1-II.3). This, however, is so far just the preparation for the interpretation, not the interpretation itself. Nate summed up this first part of Heidegger’s project by suggesting that the everyday understanding of being, the starting point for the existential analytic, already situates dasein’s being within the interpretation’s ‘fore-having,’ the formal indications provide the guiding point of view, or ‘fore-sight’ for the interpretation, and finally the care-structure—‘(who)-being-in-the-world’ construed as ‘ahead-of-itself–already-being-in (a world) as being-amidst (intraworldly entities)’—provides the articulated and unified structural phenomenon, or ‘fore-conception’ to be explained and grounded in the interpretation.

Fundamental ontology’s phenomenological interpretation culminates in the temporal interpretation of dasein’s being, which was our topic to read and discuss this week (II.3-II.4). Heidegger finishes preparing to reawaken the question of the sense of being by explaining how the care structure makes sense, in its articulation and its unity, in terms of time—not just any time, but what Heidegger calls ‘originary’ temporality. Heidegger’s discussion of temporality not only explains the structure of dasein’s being in terms of some peculiar temporal phenomenon, but also explains how our ordinary conception of time, as well as the time that structures our everyday existence in the world, arise as derivatives or modifications of this more primordial sense of temporality.

Finally, looking ahead, we saw that the temporal interpretation of dasein’s being would, in turn, somehow provide the basis for reawakening the question of the sense of being (II.5-(the unpublished) Division III), by explaining that upon which [das Woraufhin] dasein always projects and understands being (being, itself; being as such; being, in general).

Spring, Week 7 Meeting -- Part II

Primordial Temporality

We began with a major interpretive question, which we raised but did not resolve: Is Heidegger simply setting us up to explain what being means to dasein, the sense of being as dasein understands it? or should we understand his goal to be setting us up to explain the sense of being, itself (as such, in general), independently of the terms in which dasein might happen to understand it? One way to ask this question is to ask whether the ‘setup’ provided by fundamental ontology—explaining how being is intelligible at all to dasein by interpreting dasein’s being in terms of time—ever gets ‘discharged’ so that we are simply left with being’s intelligibility simpliciter (dasein’s understanding of it notwithstanding).

We then wondered what kind of phenomenon primordial temporality is. Jim pointed out that there are two obvious ways to understand 'time': the linear temporal sequence measured by clocks (now-time, clock time, the ordinary conception of time), and time as it is experienced in the context of our daily activities (which Heidegger calls 'world-time'). Since Heidegger is going to derive both of these from primordial temporality, this latter must be something else entirely. We suggested that if primordial temporality is supposed to ground both the time of science (and present-at-hand entities) and the time of concern (and so ready-to-hand equipment), then it cannot be an experienced phenomenon but must be part of a structural explanation of how dasein as concernful being-in-the-world is possible. This makes it theoretically analogous to the structure of self-consciousness or the constitution of the soul or psyche, since these are not experienced as such but are rather what makes any experience possible at all. Since Heidegger has argued that, considered purely as a structure, anticipatory resoluteness (authenticity) is the condition of possibility of being-in-the-world, it follows that at this level of abstraction, anticipatory resoluteness is identical to primordial temporality. That is to say, both anticipatory resoluteness and originary temporality play the same role, as the condition of possibility of dasein. (This is, for example, why Heidegger can argue that primordial temporality is finite, by virtue of the fact that authenticity is also finite as being-towards-death.) Accordingly, we went on to explore primordial temporality by considering the structure of anticipatory resoluteness.

Spring, Week 7 Meeting -- Part III

Anticipatory Resoluteness

To get clear on anticipatory resoluteness, we looked at its concrete manifestation in the example of Plenty Coups – particularly as contrasted to Sitting Bull. (We did, however, entertain the possibility that Plenty Coups does not strictly count as authentic, since he is a transitional figure who makes possible a fully authentic 'Crow poet'). We compared Plenty Coups's anticipation of death with Sitting Bull's inauthentic awaiting of an external, worldly event. We noticed that in his awaiting, Sitting Bull did not authentically retrieve or repeat the past of his tradition by appropriating a possibility from it that would be appropriate to new circumstances (as Plenty Coups did), but simply took over, and clung to, the Ghost Dance. (It was not clear, however, how this fits with Heidegger's characterisation of the inauthentic past as forgetting). Sitting Bull's awaiting was thus not passive in the ordinary sense, but involved a lot of activity. (Recall that when Heidegger introduced inauthenticity, he insisted that it is not inactive, but can go along precisely with busy-ness in the world of concern). This led us to wonder about the authentic way of making-present. Heidegger describes the authentic present in terms of both the Situation (which involves resolute taking action) and the Moment of Vision (in which nothing happens). We suggested that Plenty Coups's dream vision can be understood as a Moment of Vision, because it is much like the limit-experience of Angst, and involves the far-reaching sighting of possibilities (for Crow subjectivity) characteristic of resolute, anticipatory understanding.

Spring, Week 7 Meeting -- Part IV

Temporality

We then turned to Heidegger's characterisation of temporality as the finite temporalising of the ecstases. Heidegger describes temporality by saying that the future makes present in the process of having been – or, more literally translated, temporality is the beening, presenting future (SZ 326). We noted that the future (Zu-kunft) is to be understood as 'coming-towards' (zu-kommen), and that it has a priority over the present and having been (the past). We can see this priority, for example, in the fact that for a stacker, the book shows up as something-to-be-put-away (present) on the basis of a self-understanding as a stacker (the future), rather than vice versa. Heidegger also says that having been is grounded in the future – and presumably he means that our past is what it is only on the basis of how we take it up in projecting ourselves into the future.

We then went on to consider the ecstatic character of temporality. "Ecstasis" comes from the Greek, and means 'standing-out.' So when Heidegger says that temporality is ecstatic, he means that it stands out – and it does so in three 'directions' or 'ecstases' (future, having been, present). Further, temporality is "the ekstatikon pure and simple" (SZ 329), where this means that there is nothing from which temporality stands out (a self-contained substance, say). Rather, temporality just is this movement of standing out. So too for Dasein – whose essence, recall, lies in existence (ex-sistere, to stand out).

Nate pointed out (anticipating our reading for the next meeting) that each ek-stasis has a horizon, and that looking at those horizons might give us some helpful clues for making sense of how temporality is ecstatic, what it means to be an ecstasis, and how this feature of the structure of originary temporality is supposed to be apt for interpreting dasein’s being. The horizon of the future ecstasis of time is something intelligible in terms of the ‘for-the-sake-of’ relation; dasein is futural insofar as it somehow ‘comes toward’ itself in existing for-the-sake-of-itself. The horizon of the past ecstasis of time is that in the face of which dasein has been thrown; dasein is ‘beening’ (or ‘having been’) insofar as it finds itself thrown into its existence and world and finds this mattering to it, for instance through moods. The horizon of the present ecstasis of time, Heidegger says, is something intelligible in terms of the ‘in-order-to’ relation; dasein presents (or ‘makes present’) insofar as intraworldly entities show up to it intelligibly, which is to say, insofar as it deals with (or comports understandingly toward) the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand in existing. From this we concluded that the structure of these temporal ecstases will make more sense if we can figure out what sorts of things can count as (a) that for the sake of which dasein exists, (b) that in the face of which dasein finds itself thrown and (c) that which can show up to dasein as fitting into a series of in-order-to relations constitutive of dasein’s concern.

Spring, Week 5 Meeting -- Part I

Introduction, Orientation

At this meeting, we were very lucky to have Professor Jonathan Lear visit as our guest speaker. (You can find out more about his work here). Prof. Lear's most recent book, Radical Hope, uses the historical example of the Crow chief, Plenty Coups, to explore the collapse of a way of life and the question of how to live with this possibility. We can read this text as an attempt to come to terms with what Heidegger means by authentic being-towards-death. Kate suggested that we can map the three chapters of Radical Hope on to the first three chapters of Division II of Being and Time in the following way (click on the table to see it full-size):

Spring, Week 5 Meeting -- Part II

Jonathan Lear on Radical Hope and Being and Time

Prof. Lear began by talking about the personal and philosophical genesis of Radical Hope. With respect to Being and Time, the concern is about the lack of clarity regarding its ethical dimension: if authenticity is an ontological or existential phenomenon rather than an ethical one, how does it show up in a life? Is it consistent with being a bad person? To really understand authenticity, we need to consider Heidegger's ontology through a concrete case. Radical Hope is an attempt to do this.

Such an approach can reveal various things about what it is to understand being that are not obvious in the abstract register in which BT is written. Jonathan outlined two of these. First, in considering the breaking down of an understanding of being, we must distinguish between the demands of theoretical reason and those of practical reason. We might think that since the Crow can still remember their old ways of life, these therefore remain intelligible. So where is the breakdown? This question reveals that while the concepts in question may remain theoretically intelligible, they are not thereby practically intelligible (as items of practical reason). The breakdown takes place in our self-understanding – it is a breakdown in my ability to make sense of myself and others in terms of these concepts. This is a breakdown in my ability to move from a theoretical understanding of the past to a practical understanding of how I am to go on in the present and the future.

Second, we need to distinguish between the psychological phenomenon and the ontological phenomenon of breakdown. It is a mistake to think that the breakdown of intelligibility at issue is a psychological state that I manifest. Jonathan clarified this mistake by outlining three senses of intelligibility and its breakdown, using the example of marriage:

1. It no longer makes sense that I am (or was) married to this person. This is an issue about my relationship to another person, and it is a psychological phenomenon.

2. The idea of marriage no longer makes sense to me. This is a problem in my relationship to a concept, and is also a psychological phenomenon.

3. The intelligibility of the concept of marriage breaks down. This does not happen to me, but to the concept or way of life itself. The concept – rather than my relationship to it – breaks down. This is an ontological phenomenon, and there are many different ways of relating to it psychologically. (Jonathan gave the example of a future kalipolis, in which the Guardians abolish all intimacy and sexual reproduction. In this situation, I might be able to remember the concept of marriage, but I can no longer take this theoretical understanding and intelligibly render myself as married.)

This third case is not a psychological phenomenon, and it does not involve a breakdown in a theoretical understanding. Rather, a way of living with this concept breaks down. The suggestion is that this is what the Crow had to endure. This shows us something about what an understanding being is – namely, that it is crucial to an understanding of being that we are able to live (with) it. Accordingly, Jonathan suggested that we take the kind of breakdown in an understanding of being that Prof. Haugeland focuses on (a theoretical breakdown, exemplified by crises in the sciences) as a special case rather than as the paradigm.

Spring, Week 5 Meeting -- Part III

Discussion

Jim asked: how can we judge that Plenty Coups was right and Sitting Bull was wrong? That is, how can we tell the difference between courageously redefining one's culture and betraying it? Jonathan acknowledged that this is a contested issue. But what is clear is that Sitting Bull's response does not count as courageous: doing nothing else but dance the Ghost Dance for several months in order to wipe out the white settlers. This is instead wishful optimism. But it does not follow that fighting to the death is necessarily a worse or less courageous decision than Plenty Coups'.

One philosophical question in this is: if the virtues are character formations that involve relating to possibilities, then can there be a virtuous response to a breakdown in the very field of possibilities? Is virtue possible at all in this situation? If so, then it is likely that this virtue will be courage. Courage is a way of living well with the riskiness of human life, and so a good candidate for virtuously facing up to a risk to a way of life. However, courage is traditionally associated with battle and manliness, so it needs to be thinned out. Aristotle supplies us with the framework for a thinned-out concept of courage, and Plenty Coups (via his dream) supplies us with an account of the psychological transformation required to thin out a traditional conception of courage and so meet a crisis virtuously.

Nathana asked how successful we can consider Plenty Coups to have been in securing the Crow's future, given that he considered his reservation life to be one in which nothing happened. Surely he was not the Crow poet opening up a new future for the Crow? Jonathan agreed: Plenty Coups is successful as a transitional figure (like Moses) in that he made it possible for the Crow to go on without despair until poets could arise to reinvent Crow culture and traditions.

Part of what is involved in this is a firm commitment to a transcendent goodness in the world. This commitment is what allows a people to endure transition, and it is one reason that the Crow might have decided not to go down fighting. Such a belief in transcendent goodness may be religious ('God made the world good'), but it need not be. We could also hold to a secular transcendence: we are finite, and to embrace this involves accepting that our best understanding of the good is also finite – that goodness outstrips us. (This vocabulary brings us quite close to what Heidegger means by authentic being-towards-death.) A commitment to our finitude and a transcendent goodness is manifest in the ability to endure transitional periods.

In response to a question from Josh, Jonathan pointed out that it is easy to overlook what is going on in this transitional period. From a certain perspective, it may seem that what happened to the Crow is just the stuff of history. We might think that understandings of being don't really break down, but they do change in response to challenges and so manifest various continuities and discontinuities. The Crow, then, have a past, present and a future (albeit a rather dramatic one). If this is right, there is no philosophy to be done here, only anthropology. But this picture overlooks what is important about the transitional period. In those 60-75 years, there was some important sense in which no one could say what they were doing. There was no answer to what it is to be a chief, or even to be a Crow. After this period (as we are seeing now), creative activities within Crow life begin to supply answers to these questions. Things happened during the transitional period that allowed for this creative reinvention, and the philosophical question is: how are we to understand these transitional happenings ontologically? What kind of happenings are they? This philosophical-ontological issue is very easy to overlook.

Finally, Aaron and Jim asked questions about how we can identify those aspects of a way of life or understanding of being the breakdown of which counts as death or the collapse of a way of life. Are there not cases in which something becomes impossible that nonetheless do not count as such a breakdown? Jonathan pointed out that it is not sufficient to just say that the difference here is the psychological one of how much you guide life by a particular possibility or understanding. Although it is difficult to judge some cases, we can reliably identify clear cases of discontinuity (death) and continuity (non-death). The important thing is to avoid the temptation to overlook the discontinuity in a way of life – to overlook its breakdown – and to consider it just as the passage of a culture through history.

Spring, Week 5 Meeting -- Part IV

Heidegger

Although we didn't explicitly discuss the theoretical framework of Heidegger's anticipatory resoluteness (II.III), we did get clearer on what the commitment and flexibility of authenticity looks like in a human life. We also continued our exploration of what death, the breakdown of an understanding of being, amounts to. Notice that in talking about authenticity, we have employed the vocabulary of temporality: authenticity is a matter of being able to stand firmly in the present and go on into the future on the basis of (or despite) a radical break in one's past. At our next meeting, we will consider in more detail the temporality of dasein and authenticity.