Winter, Week 3 Meeting - Part I

Admin

Reading for next time (2/7): §§31-38. If you can’t read everything, skip §33 (assertion) and, if you have to, §32 (interpretation). We’ll discuss these the least, if at all.

Winter, Week 3 Meeting - Part II

I.V: Being-in and the There (§28)

We began by recalling the way in which being-in is unified with the 'who' (I.4) and 'world' (I.3) to form dasein's basic constitution: being-in-the-world. Nate drew John Haugeland's infamous coin diagram, which shows the who and world as two sides of a coin, the metal of which is being-in. We noted that the three structural moments of being-in (understanding, findingness and discourse) should each be understood as helping disclose both dasein’s ‘who’ and ‘world’ at the same time, since these are the two sides, faces or aspects of being-in. That is to say, things like moods (and, as we will see when we discuss understanding, possibilities) let both dasein and intraworldly entities show up. We compared this interrelation of dasein and its world, as illustrated in the coin diagram, to Heidegger's suggestion that if we insist on talking in terms of subject and object, then dasein is the being of the 'between' between the two (even though this can still carry misleading connotations of literal spatiality).

Being-in was introduced briefly in §12, which argued that it is not a spatial phenomenon (as if dasein were present inside something larger), and that it is manifest in engaged activities such as producing, attending, looking after, undertaking, considering. We briefly wondered whether these are cognitive phenomena, and decided that to the extent that they seem to be so, Heidegger will explain this feature in a way that does not appeal strictly to the mind or its acts. Heidegger's explanation of how such comportments towards entities are possible is in I.5, in which he outlines the structural features of dasein's very openness or being-there.

Da-sein is to be (sein) the there (da). We read the passage on SZ133 in which Heidegger introduces the there as the clearing or dasein's disclosedness. The key point is that dasein is not closed off like a Cartesian subject, but is open – indeed, it is openness. In other words, dasein is the 'space' or 'light' in which entities can show up or remain hidden. This openness is the there or the da. We suggested that the account of the structure of the there – of dasein's disclosedness – will be Heidegger's answer to traditional accounts of (self-)consciousness.

We listed several phrases Heidegger uses to try to characterize dasein’s being:

• Dasein is the clearing (or being-lit-up).
• Dasein is its disclosedness.
• Dasein is its ‘there.’
• The essence of dasein is existence (to be dasein is to exist).
• To be its ‘there’ is (in each case) an issue for dasein.
• Dasein is essentially constituted by being-in-the-world.

These all seem to exhibit a rough sense of equivalence, so that what we understand about one phenomenon (clearing, disclosedness, the there, existence, being-in-the-world, being an issue) should shed light on our understanding of the others.

Winter, Week 3 Meeting - Part III

I.V: Thrownness (§29)

Dasein is thrown into the there. We read the introduction of thrownness on SZ 135, and saw that talk of dasein's thrownness "is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over." Delivered over to what? Starting with the difference between being raised on a farm and moving to a farm later in life, we suggested several different levels, or scopes, of thrownness: in each case, dasein is thrown into dealing with the entities that are there (e.g. the chairs that are in the classroom, the chalk that is here and the eraser that isn't), thrown into a particular body (e.g. one that's too short for the NBA), thrown into a particular point in its life (e.g. being a 20-something college student), thrown into a particular time, place and tradition (e.g. 21^st Century America), and ultimately thrown into being a case of dasein at all – being the kind of entity for which things are meaningful. We saw that it is a consequence of thrownness that some things are possible for us (e.g. being a college student) and some things are not possible (e.g. being a Samurai warrior). Finally, we noticed that Heidegger describes the 'whence' and 'whither' of the throw as obscure, and suggested that this obscurity is manifest in questions like, 'why am I here?', 'what is the meaning of life?', and 'where do I come from?', the answers to which seem ‘enigmatic’ and ‘shrouded in mystery.’

Winter, Week 3 Meeting - Part IV

I.V: Findingness and Moods (§29, §30)

Thrownness is revealed in findingness. Findingness is a structural moment or element of being-in, which often manifests itself in the form of moods. When we are thrown into being-x, we find ourselves as x, and so as thrown into x. 'Findingness' is our preferred translation of Befindlichkeit, which M&R translate as 'state-of-mind'. 'State-of-mind' is profoundly misleading because what Heidegger means by Befindlichkeit is neither mental nor a state. (Alternative translations include 'attunement,' 'disposition,’ ‘disposedness’ and Haugeland’s ‘sofindingness’). Findingness is dasein's receptivity, its ability to "tune in", if you will, to the "vibes" that are there (thanks to Richard Polt for remembering the 60's).

Moods are modes or manifestations of findingness. Because of the German word he uses (Stimmung), Heidegger often thinks of moods in musical terms. They are like the soundtrack to one's life, and they constitute the framework or mise-en-scene within which things show up in a certain way. Thus moods are disclosive or uncovering. (In a film, when soft music is playing a stare shows up as an indication of affection, but with a different kind of music it can reveal resentment or imminent aggression). Moods uncover entities in the way they matter to dasein. We noticed that in the analysis of fear (§30), the three structural moments correspond to the three structural moments of being-in-the-world: in fearing (being-in), dasein is fearful for itself (the ‘who’) in the face of a fearsome entity (the world). This shows that, as Heidegger says, moods—and findingness in general—disclose the whole of being-in-the-world.

We recognised that moods are only one mode of findingness, and so that there are other modes – notably, perception or sensation. Further, what Heidegger means by 'mood' covers not only feelings or affects (joy, hate, fear, indifference etc), but more broadly one's general disposition (e.g. a cheerful disposition) and even the mood of a community or era (the Zeitgeist).

We discussed whether cases of dasein always find themselves thrown into a mood (roughly, whether moods are passive), given that it is possible to control one's mood and sometimes to effect a counter-mood. (Which, note, suggests that we are always in some mood or other.) We decided that even though we can perform activities to encourage a change in our mood, this amounts to a receptivity to a new mood rather than an active choice of mood.

Winter, Week 3 Meeting - Part V

I.V: Understanding (§31)

We did not discuss Heidegger's analysis of understanding in §30, although we did note that understanding has to do with possibilities and is something like the 'active' or 'spontaneous' counterpart to the 'receptivity' of findingness. We will discuss this further next time.

Winter, Week 1 Meeting - Part I

Admin

During the winter term, we will meet Thursdays 6:00-8:00 p.m., odd weeks, room TBA. Our next meeting will be on Thursday, January 24, and we will read §§28-31 of Division I, chapter 5.

Anyone who wasn’t at the meeting but still wants to continue with the group, please send either Nate (nsz at uchicago) or Kate (kwithy at uchicago) an e-mail, so that we can keep you on the e-mail list.

Finally, we’d like to let you be more involved in running the discussion group. There are two things you can help us with: First, you could volunteer to kick off the discussion, summarizing what you think are important points in the reading, pointing out passages that were confusing or tricky and seem worth discussing, drawing a chart on the board, asking a general or comparative question about the topic in the reading, etc. Second, you could volunteer to note down what we discuss in our group meeting and write the main points up for posting on the blog. You can volunteer for either by posting a comment here.

Winter, Week 1 Meeting - Part II

Situating I.IV

We began our discussion by recalling the place of this chapter in the structure of Division I: we are investigating dasein as being-in-the-world; I.III analysed the world, I.V will cover being-in, and I.IV discusses ‘who’ (not ‘what’) it is that is in the everyday world.

Last time, we saw that not just equipment, but also other cases of dasein show up within the work-world. How, then, do they show up? We charted the ontological structures common to both equipment and others (click the chart to see it full-size):

Winter, Week 1 Meeting - Part III

I.IV: Being-with and dasein-with (§26)

Others are encountered from out of the work-world, and they are encountered as dasein – more specifically, in their being as dasein-with (Mitdasein). I share my everyday world with these others, which is accordingly a with-world (Mitwelt). This is possible because dasein is essentially being-with (Mitsein) – being-with(-others) is an existentiale; it is part of what it takes to be dasein. Thus being-with is “autonomous” and “irreducible,” and Heidegger does not face the problem of other minds – it’s impossible to make sense of oneself as dasein without already being able to make sense of others as cases of dasein, too.

We wondered about the sense of ‘with’ at issue here – is it that (i) a carpenter can only be a carpenter if there are others to purchase tables, produce hammers and so on (playing the other roles that make up the whole context of carpentry), or that (ii) a carpenter can only be a carpenter if there are other carpenters, such that the social role of ‘carpenter’ is available in the first place? We decided that both were involved in being-with others in a with-world. Recall that the with-which of equipment-use has to do with the other equipment involved in the relevant, purposive context (the nails and boards that go along with the hammer, say). This supports the idea that ‘with’ in ‘being-with’ has to do with other roles in the relevant context of existence (the carpenter’s boss, customers and co-workers, say). At the same time, being-with is supposed to capture the normativity involved in existence, the way that one’s way of life can be shared and lived in a common, standard manner. This supports the idea that ‘with’ in ‘being-with’ has to do with the possibility that (numerically) more than one case of dasein be able to live any particular way of life.

We briefly discussed being-alone as illuminating being-with: being-alone is not the opposite of being-with(-others), but a deficient mode of it that is possible only if dasein is essentially being-with. The reason is that being-alone is to be understood as being-with others in the mode of indifference or not mattering – which is also why the mere presence of more others doesn’t change one’s being-alone (one can be equally alone on a crowded bus as in an isolation chamber).

Finally, we flagged that, just as others are usually understood in terms of the work world, and so in terms of what they do, so too I typically understand myself in terms of what I do.

Winter, Week 1 Meeting - Part IV

I.IV: Das Man (§27)

We began by noting that the various English translations of ‘das Man’ – ‘the They,’ ‘the One,’ ‘the Anyone’ – each have drawbacks. In particular, ‘the They’ implies that it refers to everyone else but me, whereas das Man is something to which I belong, and ‘the One’ implies that it refers to just one, perhaps exemplary, entity, whereas das Man is someone whom anyone and everyone can be (and usually is).

We wondered about the extent to which das Man is the same as, or coextensive with, societies or communities. We noted that there will be overlapping das Man structures at various levels – i.e., norms that govern being at the U of C, living in Hyde Park, being an American, being an international academic, etc.

Das Man is the ‘who’ of everyday being-in-the-world, the ‘subject’ of everydayness. In my everyday life, I am a ‘they-self.’ As a they-self, I am not my authentic self. We briefly discussed some of the difficulties in making sense of this: the authentic self is in some way opposed to das Man, and yet Heidegger enigmatically says that it is an “existentiell modification” of it. Indeed, das Man is an existentiale, so authentic cases of dasein will not be removed from, apart from, or in opposition to das Man.

We suggested that what is distinctive about being authentic has to do with taking responsibility, rather than going against social norms (although sometimes this can be part of taking responsibility). This conclusion came out of discussing tricky examples of ‘firsts’—when someone creates and/or wears the first pair of shoes, when someone becomes the first lawmaker of the Wild West, when someone first comes up with a revolutionary theory. These cases are difficult to situate in terms of das Man. On the one hand, there is something new and unprecedented in such activity, so they look like examples of bucking (or creating) social norms. On the other hand, such phenomena as shoes, law in the West and, say, quantum physics, don’t come into view until they are possibilities for dasein, which is to say, until they are ways to exist, or equipment with which to exist, that can be shared by more than one case of dasein (this is part of the point in saying that being-with is an existentiale). We brought out this latter point by reflecting that even the Wild West bandit is governed by a set of social norms, and can only occur in a social context in which such banditry is possible, for instance where there is already a sheriff to be riled up. Again, this led us to think of authenticity less in terms of creating new ways to live ex nihilo, and more in terms of taking responsibility for maintaining or modifying those ways of living already available and intelligible within one’s world.